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All for a Fortnight: Calculating Redemption in
Default Residential Foreclosures
Alex S. Moe*
The Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) is a comprehensive
statute laying out a single procedure for the entire foreclosure process.
Residential foreclosures are dominated by statutory redemption, a sevenmonth period during which the borrower can pay off the entire loan balance
and retain their property. Few borrowers do so, but the redemption period
is independently important, for until it expires, a sale of the property—
cornerstone of the foreclosure process—cannot occur.
The statutory redemption period starts to run when the borrower has been
served. Normally, service occurs at a point certain in time. If service occurs
by publication, however, the publication runs for three consecutive weeks.
In that scenario, redemption should be calculated based on the third date of
publication. This conclusion comports with the plain language of the statute,
its lengthy history, and all available records of legislative intent.
New evidence suggests that more than four hundred residential
foreclosures per year in Cook County alone have redemption periods
miscalculated from the first date of publication. This is especially
problematic because these are almost always cases where borrowers have
not participated in the judicial process, and are unaware that their statutory
rights have been infringed.
Fortunately, this issue permits a straightforward resolution. Plaintiff’s
firms can adjust their calculations to use the third date of publication. The
judiciary can enforce compliance on a case-by-case basis, or systemically
through an appropriate general order. Uniformly calculating redemption
based on the last publication is not only consistent with the law and in accord
with the broader statutory scheme, but also ensures that all borrowers in
foreclosure benefit from the full measure of the IMFL’s statutory protections.
* The author is a judicial law clerk with the Circuit Court of Cook County, and has clerked in
both the Mortgage Foreclosure/Mechanics Lien and General Chancery sections. The views
expressed in this Article are the author’s and his alone, and should not be construed as endorsed
either by the Judge whom he serves or the court. Special thanks to attorneys David Griffin, Jenna
M. Rogers, and Arthur C. Czaja for their insights; and to Talar A. Khosdeghian, Nicole Collins,
Suzanne McFate, and Dr. Lawrence Moe for their assistance in this process. A particular thanks to
the (often necessarily) anonymous practitioners, judges, and clerks who shared their time and
personal experiences to inform this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Foreclosure of a residential mortgage in Illinois is a tightly controlled
process. From beginning to end, the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law
(IMFL) establishes a series of minimum requirements for every step of
the foreclosure, from first filing to an eventual eviction. The statute
strikes a balance: lenders benefit from clearly defined obligations and
largely form-based litigation, while borrowers benefit from generous
waiting periods. Central to this balance is statutory redemption, a sevenmonth window during which borrowers can essentially pay off the loan
and rescue their property.
The primary purpose of redemption is not, as the definition suggests,
an actual redemption. Relatively few borrowers have the means to
formally exercise their redemption rights; if a borrower can pay off their
loan, chances are they would have done so before the foreclosure was
filed. Rather, the redemption period provides time: time for a borrower to
get back on their feet, time for the parties to negotiate another form of
settlement, and—as a matter of public policy—time for the borrower to
stay in their home.
The IMFL accomplishes this by using redemption to establish a simple
waiting period. A lender may seek and receive a judgment of foreclosure
early on in the process. But they cannot hold a judicial sale of the subject
property until the redemption period expires. The timing of redemption
is of critical importance to determine when and how the case can move
forward.
Redemption is calculated from the date of service on the borrower.1
Personal service occurs on a specific date, so this is a simple calculation.2
Service by publication, however, occurs over a three-week period, so
redemption could be calculated from the first or the third publication
date.3 If redemption should be calculated from the third date, but is
actually being calculated from the first, the entire foreclosure process is
accelerated by two weeks, and the IMFL’s central balance would be
disrupted.
New research demonstrates that it is common practice to calculate
redemption from the first publication. In approximately 3.9 percent of
residential foreclosure cases, service occurred by publication, redemption
was calculated from the first of the three publications rather than the third,

1. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b) (2020).
2. Relatively. See infra Section II.A (appropriate mode of calculation).
3. § 15-1603(b)(1).
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and the foreclosure sale occurred immediately after redemption expired.
This extrapolates to approximately 430 cases yearly.4
Foreclosure is a volume business; the IMFL has likely seen a million
residential foreclosures,5 and any systemic issue can only be coherently
described as a matter of statistics. To reach these conclusions, more than
three hundred foreclosure filings were randomly sampled to generate
some basic conclusions about residential foreclosure practice.6 The data
derives from Cook County residential foreclosures filed in 2018, and as
such is an imperfect proxy for an issue of statewide concern, but it is
robust enough to sustain general conclusions.7
4. This conclusion can be reached by two different analyses: through court records, and through
external sources. First, the 3.9 percent figure is for cases filed as Owner Occupied Single Family
Home or Condominium (OOSFHC) foreclosures. Such cases represent about 90 percent of all
foreclosure filings generally. Audit Report, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division,
2019 (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author). Furthermore, the Institute for Housing Studies at DePaul
University maintains a database of residential foreclosure filings. Housing Market Indicators Data
Portal: Total Foreclosure Filings Activity – All Residential Properties, INST. FOR HOUSING STUD.
DEPAUL
UNIV.
[hereinafter
Residential
Foreclosure
Filings
Database],
https://www.housingstudies.org/data-portal/browse/?indicator=total-foreclosureactivity&view_as=view-table (last visited May 4, 2020) (choose “All Residential Properties” from
the “Property Type” dropdown, then click “Submit”). Court records look to foreclosure filings at
the front end; the IHS database cross-checks land and title records to identify residential cases “on
the ground,” as it were. Though they stem from different sources, both datasets indicate that
approximately 11,000 residential foreclosures are filed yearly. This suggests a final figure of 433
cases yearly. Given that limiting the analysis to OOSFHC cases omits other, smaller, types of cases
(e.g. owner-occupied buildings of six units or less, which may still count as residential property,
see infra notes 34–35), the 3.9 percent figure is likely an underestimate. And, given the approximate
margins of error of this analysis, two significant figures are indicated; thus the final estimate of 430.
5. Between 2005 and 2018, Cook County alone saw 378,000 residential foreclosure filings.
Residential Foreclosure Filings Database, supra note 4. Add to that figure all filings between 1987
and 2004, and filings in the rest of the state during both time periods, and a million is a decent
enough estimate.
6. Cases filed in Cook County are assigned sequential case numbers based on the date of filing.
In 2018, 16,195 chancery cases were filed. All foreclosures are chancery cases, but not all chancery
cases are foreclosures. Cases were sampled sequentially, starting with 18 CH 00001, until ten cases
coded as OOSFHC were recorded. Then, sampling jumped to the next five hundred cases (e.g., 18
CH 00500), and another ten cases were recorded. This procedure was repeated for all 2018 cases,
for a total of 330 cases evenly distributed over the course of the year. For each case, information
was collected by reviewing scanned copies of affidavits, orders, and other documents of public
record. Specific information recorded included the dates of publication, of judgment, and of sale,
if any; the case’s ultimate disposition; whether it was contested; and other information. Thus,
though the purpose of the sampling was to identify publication dates, the dataset is broad enough
to reveal other first-order conclusions, referenced elsewhere in this Article. The data is available
upon request, and the author would be happy to share it with any interested parties. Accessing case
files is a time-consuming procedure, and to the author’s knowledge, no one else has been daft
enough to do something like this before.
7. Limitations of the above described analysis are legion: it only samples 2018 data; it is
restricted to Cook County; and the sampling methodology, while necessary to preserve the author’s
sanity, introduces potential clumping artifacts; among many others. It is nevertheless sufficiently
robust for these purposes. External data indicates that 11,000 OOSFHC cases—far and away the
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If, as this Article argues, redemption must be calculated from the third
publication, then this systemic miscalculation is significant. Where
redemption ends two weeks early, the entire timeline is accelerated, and
the foreclosure sale, confirmation, and eventual eviction happen two
weeks before they should have. And, crucially, this occurs where the
borrowers were unaware that such miscalculation was taking place, and
that the full measure of redemption entitled them to more.
To fully address the origin of this issue, Part I of this Article starts with
a general overview of the IMFL, discussing the four mechanisms that
permit a borrower to force a lender’s hand and accept a form of
settlement: statutory reinstatement, statutory redemption, the special right
of redemption, and equitable redemption. These four redemptive
mechanisms work in concert to offer borrowers windows of opportunity
to save their properties. Their histories are intertwined, and understanding
where each came from is necessary to untangle the conflict surrounding
redemption.
Part II addresses the proper measure of redemption. The time period is
supposed to run from the date of service, but service by publication does
not occur on a single date. This Article proposes that, where a borrower
is served by publication, the redemption period must run from the third
and final publication, rather than the first. This conclusion is evident from
the plain language of the redemption statute, the operation of the
publication statute, and the history of both.
Part III turns to the problem at hand: calculating redemption from the
first publication is incorrect, and yet it still occurs. There are a number of
institutional pressures that explain the miscalculation’s frequency. The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that it will only ever affect cases where
the borrower has not participated—for if a borrower shows up and
contests their case, the resulting delay would moot the question of
publication.
Fortunately for borrowers and the redemption statute alike, addressing
this issue is relatively straightforward: once plaintiff’s attorneys and
most common type, and a good proxy for conventionally “residential” foreclosures, see infra
Section I.B.1—were filed in 2018. Cochran’s formula suggests, for a 95 percent confidence interval
and 0.5 standard deviation, an ideal population size is in the 385 range. The margin of error here is
difficult to calculate, both because the methodology is not ideal and there are a number of
extrapolations between stages of the calculation. To the extent possible, the data itself was
calculated with a standard 95 percent confidence interval, suggesting the 3.9 percent figure is
±0.175. Accounting for extrapolations—e.g. potential miscoding of OOSFHC cases, and
foreclosure filing frequency—the actual error is more likely ±1.0. Plugging this into the statistical
analysis, supra note 4, yields a final Cook County estimate of 320–540 cases yearly. A more
statistically rigorous study would be more precise, but this analysis is sufficiently accurate for these
purposes; even on the most skeptical of assumptions, it is clear that redemption is miscalculated in
hundreds of cases every year.
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judges are aware of the potential for a miscalculated redemption period,
it is easily corrected. Furthermore, judicial action by way of a general
order directing that the proper calculation be followed would provide the
cleanest solution. Regardless of how it is eventually addressed,
calculating redemption from the third publication not only comports with
the letter of the law but also ensures that the IMFL’s careful balances are
maintained, to all parties’ benefit.
I. MORTGAGE, FORECLOSURE, AND REDEMPTION
The IMFL is a complex statute, but it is entirely self-contained. Within
its confines, the redemption procedure both fundamentally defines the
foreclosure timeline while also largely standing apart from the rest of the
foreclosure process. Thus, while redemption drives every single case, it
is very rarely litigated, and does not often get dragged into other
foreclosure litigation.
This Part first discusses the foreclosure timeline generally to provide
context. Second, it addresses certain caveats of scope: this Article’s
discussion is limited to residential borrowers only, as redemptive rights
are limited to a much greater degree in other cases. Third, it describes the
four primary redemptive mechanisms of the IMFL: statutory
reinstatement, statutory redemption, the special right of redemption, and
equitable redemption.
A. The Foreclosure Timeline
The IMFL sets out a unified foreclosure procedure that strikes a careful
balance between the interests of a lending mortgagee and the borrowing
mortgagors.8 Lenders benefit from a streamlined procedure, form
complaints and standardized affidavits, and limitations on the types of
defenses that may be litigated in the course of a foreclosure.9 Borrowers,
in turn, benefit from the IMFL’s generous timeline and many windows
of opportunity through which they may rescue their properties.10

8. Wells Fargo Bank v. Simpson, 2015 IL App (1st) 142925, ¶ 45.
9. Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 24 (basic statutory framework); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/15-1504 (2020) (form complaint); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 113(c) (form prove-up
affidavit); Parkway Bank & Tr. Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶¶ 2, 20–78 (rejecting a
number of common, unfounded defenses).
10. Chief among these is the redemption statute, the subject of this Article. 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).

2020]

All for a Fortnight

1039

The foreclosure itself follows a single sequential procedure.11 Every
foreclosure will start when the mortgagor defaults,12 usually by failing to
pay the monthly mortgage payment when due.13 The mortgagee must
then send a number of pre-foreclosure notices, offering an opportunity to
cure.14 If no action is taken, the mortgagee may file its suit thereafter.15
If the mortgagee chooses to proceed,16 it will then seek and almost
certainly receive a judgment of foreclosure.17

11. In this respect the modern IMFL differs from the prior foreclosure statute, which permitted
post-sale redemption and thus allowed for property to remain in a limbo of seisin for a time after
the foreclosure itself terminated. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, ¶ 57 (1975). Indeed, one of the major
changes in the modern IMFL was to mandate that the sale occur after redemption, thus ensuring
that all windows of opportunity expire prior to the sale. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1507(b) (2020).
For an excellent discussion of redemption and reinstatement under the IMFL as compared to the
prior foreclosure statute, see generally Catherine A. Gnatek, The New Mortgage Foreclosure Law:
Redemption and Reinstatement, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 471, 483.
12. To assuage those of my friends in the defense bar: allegedly defaults.
13. Payment default is far and away the most common, but defaults can occur for other reasons:
nonpayment of taxes, failure to carry insurance, changing residence, failing to maintain the
property, and so forth. Pan Am. Bank v. Martino, 2018 IL App (1st) 172199-U, ¶¶ 26–28 (property
taxes); Wells Fargo Bank v. Balachia-Zapalik, 2018 IL App (2d) 170915, ¶¶ 26–27 (hazard
insurance); U.S. Bank v. Sierra, 2015 IL App (1st) 142809-U, ¶ 3 (occupying property as principal
residence); CF SBC Pledgor 1 2012-1 Tr. v. Clark/Sch., LLC, 2016 IL App (4th) 150568, ¶¶ 20,
31 (failure to maintain property and failure of LLC to remain incorporated).
14. The most salient of these is the Notice of Acceleration (NOA), a contractual requirement
present in virtually every mortgage. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Hoeft, 2015 IL App (1st) 150459, ¶ 1.
Accord, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTG.) § 8.1 cmt. a (1997) (“Virtually all
mortgages today contain acceleration clauses.”). The NOA requires a lender to notify a delinquent
borrower of the default amount and give them thirty days to cure the default. See, e.g., Hoeft, 2015
IL App (1st) 150459, ¶ 2. Upon expiration of the thirty-day period, the lender may accelerate the
entire debt and, barring any other procedural requirements, file its foreclosure action. Cathay Bank
v. Accetturo, 2016 IL App (1st) 152783, ¶ 37. The pre-foreclosure notice regime is a complex one
with far reaching ramifications, most of which are beyond the scope of this Article. For more
information, see generally Alex S. Moe, Against Accetturo and Beyond Bukowski: Litigating
Notices in Illinois Foreclosures, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 949 (2017).
15. The IMFL once contained a Grace Period Notice (GPN) requirement, since repealed. 735
ILL. COMP. STAT 5/15-1502.5 (2009) (repealed 2016). Effective between 2009 and 2016, the GPN
required mortgagees to send the eponymous grace period notice at least thirty days prior to filing
their case. Id. § 15-1502(d). Even though there is no IMFL requirement, however, there may still
be other statutory notice regimes under applicable federal law, including a federal delinquency
notice, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b)(1) (2020), federal pre-foreclosure review periods, id. § 1024.41(f),
and the face-to-face counseling requirement, 24 C.F.R. § 203.604 (2020). The interaction of federal
standards with Illinois foreclosures is poorly understood. See Moe, supra note 14, at 967–75
(discussing federal notice requirements).
16. Most of the time, the parties will settle short of a formal foreclosure sale. Around 70 percent
of all residential foreclosure cases end in a voluntary dismissal, for one of various reasons. See
supra note 4 (statistical analysis).
17. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1506 (2020). Judgments are obtained in the usual ways as any
other civil case. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1301 (2020) (default judgment); id. § 2-1005 (summary
judgment).
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The judgment of foreclosure disposes of virtually every issue in the
case; for all intents and purposes, the mortgagor has then lost their case.18
But the case is not over: the mortgagee must wait the longer of seven
months from the date of service or three months from the date of
judgment, at which point the redemption period expires.19 Only then can
the property be sold.20 Once sold, the mortgagee must present the sale
documents to the judge for confirmation of the judicial sale.21 Assuming
all is in order, the confirmation of sale order will approve the sale,
disburse sale proceeds, transfer title, and otherwise wrap up the
foreclosure.22 It will also contain an eviction order as to the
mortgagors23—and, relevant here, stay that eviction thirty days, for the
mortgagors have one more chance to redeem with the special right of
redemption, which also runs thirty days from confirmation.24 Only then
do a mortgagor’s various redemptive rights finally expire, and only then
can the new property owner move forward.25
From this alone it is apparent that the right of redemption is significant:
in establishing that the sale cannot occur until a minimum of seven
months from the date of service, it sets a minimum timeline for the bulk
of the foreclosure process.26

18. Parkway Bank & Tr. Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 60.
19. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).
20. Id. § 15-1507(b).
21. Id. § 15-1508(b). Because the sale is an extrajudicial action, technically speaking no case
needs to be pending at the time of the sale itself. Theoretically, one could seek a judgment of
foreclosure, cause the case to be terminated, execute the judgment by holding a sale, and file a
separate case solely to confirm the sale—though that would probably be a waste of time. Plaza
Bank v. Kappel, 779 N.E.2d 359, 363–64 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2002) (featuring a case dismissed with
prejudice at time of sale, but reinstated prior to confirmation of sale). Accord Robinson v. Maghee,
85 Ill. 545, 545–46 (1877) (holding if foreclosure judgment entered, and case dismissed, case may
be instated and sale approved, but only upon notice to defendant).
22. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b), (e) (2020).
23. Id. § 15-1508(g). The order approving sale can only evict named mortgagors. Evictions of
other occupants can be secured as part of the foreclosure case by filing a supplemental eviction
petition (formerly known as a supplemental petition for possession) under section 1701, id. § 151701(d), (h); accord id. § 15-1508(g), or by filing a separate action under the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-101–121 (2020). Eviction through a supplemental eviction
petition is usually faster and always cheaper, because it does not incur additional filing fees. 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1701(h)(4) (2020).
24. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1604(a) (2020).
25. The thirty-day marker is significant. It marks the end of the trial court’s primary jurisdiction,
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(a) (2020), the end of the appellate period, ILL. SUP. CT. R.
303(a)(1), and the IMFL’s own deed-vesting provisions bar most claims beyond that point, 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1509(c) (2020).
26. Redemption can be shortened in cases of abandonment, among others. 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/15-1603(b) (2020). By and large, this Article does not address such exceptions, focusing
instead on the most likely path forward: the full residential redemption period.
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B. A Question of Scope: Residential Borrowers and Other Caveats
The IMFL tracks longstanding public policy, extending its strongest
protections to residential borrowers.27 The four redemptive mechanisms
track this, and all are curtailed, to a greater or lesser degree, for
nonresidential borrowers. This Article focuses exclusively on typical
residential borrowers, and therefore explicitly excludes from its scope
both nonresidential borrowers and certain other special circumstances.
1. Residential Borrowers
The first, and arguably most important, procedural question in any
foreclosure is whether the subject property is residential. Most of the
time, the answer is intuitive: a single-family suburban home with a white
picket fence is residential, and a shopping mall is not. The IMFL, unlike
some other statutes, provides an explicit definition, most of which is
intuitive.28 At its core, section 1219 requires that residential property be
occupied by the mortgagor.29
Occupation is straightforward: a mortgagor must live at the subject
property, using it as their primary residence.30 That mortgagor must either
be the individual who executed the mortgage, or—if the property is
owned by a land trust—the trust beneficiaries.31 The definition is written
broadly, covering mortgagors and their heirs or descendants.32 If the
subject property has between one and six separate units, it can still be
considered residential so long as the mortgagor resides in one of them.33

27. First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210, ¶ 29 (providing overview
of statutory scheme’s heightened protections for homeowners). See also, e.g., Schuck v. Gerlach,
101 Ill. 338, 342–43 (1882) (explaining redemptions favored in the law).
28. Compare, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1219 (2020), with, e.g., Peterson Plaza Pres. v. City
of Chi. Dep’t of Fin., 2019 IL App (1st) 181502 (use-based classification of property as commercial
when used for residential purposes to claim tax credit).
29. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1219 (2020). There are plenty of other exceptions—farms
larger than forty acres are excluded—but the bulk of the definition boils down to two prongs. Note
that occupation alone is not enough to make property residential; if the property is not zoned for
residence, occupancy would be illegal, so actual residence is irrelevant. See Order of Nov. 13, 2014,
First Nations Bank v. Arabshian, 14 CH 05199 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Nov. 13, 2014) (finding illegal
occupancy does not affect status of property as nonresidential under IMFL definitions because court
cannot enforce illegal use of property).
30. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1219 (2020). Thus, a mortgagor may own multiple properties,
but only one of them can be “residential.”
31. Id. Note that this expands on the definition of “mortgagor” for the purposes of the rest of
the IMFL. Id. § 15-1209 (defining “mortgagor”).
32. Id. § 15-1219. Indeed, the “mortgagor” requirement is so broad that property could still
considered residential if occupied by the mortgagor’s spouse, but not the mortgagor themselves.
Id. This ensures that residential protections would still inure if the spouse who actually signed the
documents abandoned the residential spouse.
33. Id.
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Most of the time, the definition leads to logical conclusions, though
there are some seeming contradictions. If a tenant occupies a condo unit,
it’s not “residential real estate”—for the mortgagor does not live there.34
Yet if a six-flat has a live-in landlord, the entire building is considered
residential.35
The classification as residential is important for the redemptive
mechanisms, because nonresidential property—often synonymous with
“commercial” property, though the IMFL does not use that term—does
not benefit from as many protections. Waivers of reinstatement or
redemption are void with respect to residential property, but perfectly
enforceable with nonresidential property.36 Statutory redemption is seven
months for residential property, but only six months for nonresidential
property.37 And if the property has been abandoned, regardless of its
residency status, redemption can be shortened to thirty days.38 Lastly, the
special right of redemption is only available to residential borrowers.39
2. Other Considerations
Other aspects of a mortgage foreclosure are as varied as the human
imagination; institutional lenders have a strong incentive to complicate
the process, and canny defense attorneys are always testing the strength
of foreclosure cases.40 It would be impossible to investigate or disclaim
all potential circumstances, so this section focuses on two: bankruptcy
and lender consent.
Bankruptcy is an extraordinarily powerful process by design, and it
unsurprisingly has substantial ramifications on the redemptive
mechanisms of the IMFL. Depending on when the bankruptcy is filed,
what type of bankruptcy it is, whether the borrower chooses to reaffirm
34. See, e.g., Urban P’ship Bank v. Winchester-Wolcott, 2014 IL App (1st) 133556, ¶ 14.
35. Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871, ¶ 51. Note, however, that in
such a scenario the other five tenants would be entitled to other tenant protections. See, e.g., 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(h) (2020) (former landlord mortgagor must account for security
deposits). And the mortgagor could not rely solely on the “residential” classification to defeat
appointment of a receiver over the other five units. See id. § 15-1701(b)(1) (presumptive rights to
possession parsed out by unit). See also BMO Harris v. Kautz, 2014 IL App (2d) 140399
(discussing interaction of two statutes, albeit in case where subject property only contained one
unit).
36. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1601(a) (2020).
37. Id. § 15-1603(b)(1)–(2).
38. Id. § 15-1603(b)(4). This is a factual finding, usually satisfied with an affidavit from the
lender as to the property’s status. See, e.g., United States v. Starkey, No. 18-CV-02164, 2019 WL
1749523, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2019) (explaining affidavits of abandonment).
39. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1604(a) (2020).
40. See, e.g., Harold L. Levine, A Real Estate Focus: A Day in the Life of a Residential
Mortgage Defendant, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 687 (2003) (providing comprehensive overview of
defense strategies and recommendations as of 2003, years before the 2008 recession and ensuing
proliferation of caselaw).
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the debt, and what (if any) actions are taken during the bankruptcy with
respect to the property, a pending bankruptcy can have many effects.
Bankruptcy can extend some statutory periods,41 has no effect on
others,42 and has other effects as yet unsettled in the law.43
Likewise, the lender’s consent is equally powerful. As in any other
civil case, the lender and borrower can settle a foreclosure; due to the
nature of a mortgage, many of those settlements look an awful lot like a
reinstatement or a redemption.44 Not all settlements will trigger the
various statutory redemptive mechanisms.45 But, if the parties should
choose to use a statutory mechanism, they can generally do so at any
time.46 Because the limitations on reinstatement and redemption exist to
benefit the lender, the lender can choose to waive those deadlines and
accept late redemptions.47 The principal advantage to the borrower
through the redemptive mechanisms is to force the lender to accept a
reinstatement or redemption, which usually entails the lender not wanting
to do so.48
41. See, e.g., In re Snowden, 345 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 108(b) (2020)) (acknowledging Chapter 13 bankruptcy can extend special right of redemption by
60 days).
42. Bank of Am. v. Z Fin. Ill. G Props., 2016 IL App (1st) 150371-U, ¶ 29 (explaining
bankruptcy stay will not affect expiry of redemption; the stay prohibits only affirmative acts against
an estate).
43. The unknown is infinite, but one case stands out here: PNC Bank v. Wilson, a Second
District decision from 2017 that held that a discharge in bankruptcy without reaffirmation
“nullifies” the mortgage contract. 2017 IL App (2d) 151189, ¶ 26. The Wilson court clearly could
not mean what it said; if a Chapter 7 discharge “nullifies” the mortgage, what basis does the
mortgagee have to recover its attorney’s fees, or appoint a receiver, or in fact foreclose on the
suddenly “nullified” document at all? Taking Wilson to its logical extreme, if a borrower does not
reaffirm the mortgage, redemptive mechanisms simply don’t make sense; are they all therefore
extinguished? Wilson has many ramifications, and a full examination is both warranted and far
beyond the scope of this Article.
44. The most common type is a nonstatutory reinstatement. A borrower asks for reinstatement
figures, and the lender generates a reinstatement document, which functions as a contract: if the
borrower pays such-and-such amount by a date certain, the loan will be reinstated. Assuming they
do so, the loan is validly reinstated, though not through the statutory mechanism.
45. For instance, statutory reinstatement requires the payment of all lender costs and expenses
required to be paid under the mortgage. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020). A reinstatement
without payment of those costs may function as a valid settlement, but it would not be a statutory
reinstatement pursuant to section 1602. PNC Bank v. Stepney, 2014 IL App (4th) 140078-U, ¶ 31.
46. See, e.g., Van Vlissingen v. Lenz, 49 N.E. 422, 423–24 (Ill. 1897) (noting that, where the
mortgagee accelerates debt, “upon such default having been removed, or for any other reason
satisfactory to himself, [he may] waive his election and permit the contract of indebtedness to
continue under its original terms”).
47. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging lender’s right to permit borrower to reinstate); Household
Bank v. Lewis, 890 N.E.2d 934, 940 (Ill. 2008) (accepting post-sale redemption); In re Scheldt,
220 B.R. 362, 363 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998) (acknowledging that lender extended special
redemption).
48. By and large, whether a lender will accept a settlement short of foreclosure is a purely
business decision.
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The remainder of this Article assumes that the borrower is the
mortgagor of residential property as defined under section 1219, has not
sought bankruptcy relief, and has not otherwise engaged in conduct
intended to frustrate the foreclosure process.49 The Article likewise
assumes that the lender refuses to accept any other form of settlement,50
has no obligation to do so,51 and has not engaged in fraud or other
misconduct.52 In other words—no funny business.
C. Reinstatement, Redemption, and More
The IMFL offers four redemptive mechanisms, statutory procedures
through which a borrower can force the lender to relinquish rights it
would otherwise hold under the mortgage.53 Generally speaking, all four
require the borrower to pay specified outstanding amounts through
specified procedures, which grow larger and more onerous, respectively,
the longer the borrower waits. These mechanisms are powerful tools, as
they provide borrowers the only practical means under the IMFL to force
lenders to terminate a foreclosure.54
In order of availability, the IMFL grants borrowers the statutory right
of reinstatement under section 1602, the statutory right of redemption
under section 1603, the statutory special right of redemption under
section 1604, and acknowledges that borrowers may still access equitable
49. This last category is hard to define, but you often know it when you see it. See infra note
113 (discussing sovereign citizens).
50. Whatever that reason may be; it need not be nefarious. See infra note 127 (indicating
differently tranched securities can create counterintuitive incentives for lenders).
51. A lender may be obligated to accept some form of settlement for reasons external to the
IMFL. This usually comes by way of federal law, which often imposes a stunning array of loss
mitigation requirements. These often impact either the foreclosure process, the range of potential
outcomes, or both. See, e.g., Loss Mitigation Procedures, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g) (2020)
(restraining lender from seeking foreclosure judgment if borrower timely submits loss mitigation
application); HUD HANDBOOK: ADMINISTRATION OF INSURED HOME MORTGAGES (4330.1) REV5, ch. 13, § 29(A), available at https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/43301C13HSGH.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6GWF-GTVY] (stating reverse mortgagor, or their estate, may sell at any time
for lesser of outstanding debt or appraised value at time of sale).
52. This last assumption effectively negates equitable redemption. See infra Section I.C.4
(explaining equitable redemption mostly parallels statutory redemption, and generally would only
be invoked in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or other lender misconduct).
53. While in effect, the GPN requirement did not provide for redemption or reinstatement as
such. It did, however, provide a mechanism for a borrower to delay a foreclosure for up to sixty
days, and force a lender to at least consider a proposed loan workout plan. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT
5/15-1502.5 (2009) (repealed 2016). Thus, while it was in effect, the GPN joined the ranks of the
redemptive mechanisms proper as a way for a borrower to affirmatively force action in their case.
See also supra note 15 (discussing GPN).
54. As noted above, many lenders will gladly negotiate a settlement, even if it doesn’t
technically comply with the reinstatement or redemption requirements. See supra Section I.B.
Often, lenders will be obligated under federal law to do so. But if properly followed, these
mechanisms mandate an outcome in the borrower’s favor—something rare indeed in the
foreclosure business.
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redemption under section 1605.55 Though this Article focuses on
statutory redemption, all four redemptive mechanisms bear comment to
establish context for how redemption operates.
1. Statutory Reinstatement
The statutory right of reinstatement under section 1602 offers “limited
relief to temporarily distressed mortgagors prior to a foreclosure sale.”56
If the mortgagor pays all outstanding amounts due, save for accelerated
principal, the statute will cure defaults, unwind acceleration, and reinstate
the loan as it was prior to default. It is essentially statutory backsies. And,
just like schoolyard backsies, reinstatement must be executed quickly:
within ninety days of service of process on the mortgagor.
The right of reinstatement was unknown at common law.57 To the
extent courts granted mortgagors equitable relief in the nature of
reinstatement—and Illinois courts did not—they did so either through
equitable redemption or through other inchoate relief at equity.58 The
IMFL’s reinstatement statute dates to 1961.59 It remains largely
unchanged today, save for its integration into the IMFL.60
As do many statutes of a certain age, the current reinstatement statute,
section 1602, is presented in the codebooks as a single block paragraph
55. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602–1605 (2020).
56. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Walker, 437 N.E.2d 644, 646–47 (Ill. 1982).
57. Jim Blanco & David Crumbaugh, Illinois Legislative Review: Foreclosures, Redemptions,
and Homeowners, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 335, 337–38. See also Walker, 437 N.E.2d at 646–47
(reviewing statute’s history and collecting citations); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Town & Country
Assocs., 406 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1980) (same).
58. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 584–85 (1988)
(discussing forms of equitable relief used to sidestep draconian results in installment land
contracts). See, e.g., Macfadden v. Walker, 488 P.2d 1353, 1356–57 (Cal. 1971) (recasting
installment land contract as mortgage and offering “carefully hedged” equitable remedy). The
practice of using the power of chancery to get around an unjust statutory scheme in the foreclosure
context is not new. Emanuel Coll. v. Evans, 21 Eng. Rep. 494 (1625) (ordering mortgagee to accept
payment when, notwithstanding foreclosure procedure, mortgagor was unable to pay debt when
due but tendered funds thereafter).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (1963); Act Relating to Mortgages of Real Property of Nov.
14, 1961, § 7, 1961 Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. (eff. July 1, 1962). The statute was implemented
alongside other procedural changes that accompanied Illinois’ adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code; other contemporary mortgage legislation explicitly mentions the UCC as a
motivating factor. See Act to Amend the Act Concerning Mortgages of March 26, 1874, at pmbl.,
1961 Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. (Nov. 14, 1961) (amending mortgage statute).
60. The exhaustive legislative history is relatively brief. In 1973 and 1976 certain procedural
language was updated to modernize it under the 1970 Constitution. P.A. 78-263 (eff. Oct. 1, 1973)
(adding language clarifying submission to jurisdiction); P.A. 79-1358 (eff. Oct. 1, 1976)
(conforming language to Constitution). In 1986 it was shifted into the IMFL, with a minor
clarification to wording. P.A. 84-1462 (eff. July 1, 1987) (creating IMFL and updating wording
generally); P.A. 85-907 (eff. Nov. 23, 1987) (breaking out jurisdictional language into two-point
list). And in 1989, the “first date of publication” language was added. P.A. 86-974 (eff. July 1,
1990).
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of text. Yet each sentence of the whole functions as a discrete subsection,
and is useful for parsing through the statute’s function.
Starting with the opening sentence: “In any foreclosure of a mortgage
executed after July 21, 1959, which has become due prior to the maturity
date . . . through acceleration because of a default under the mortgage, a
mortgagor may reinstate the mortgage as provided herein.”61 Aside from
framing the remainder of the statute, this section identifies when the right
of reinstatement accrues. Reinstatement may be had after an acceleration
occurs because of a default. This dovetails neatly with the notice of
acceleration: when the thirty-day cure period expires, the right to
reinstatement becomes available.62 Note, however, that this makes
reinstatement unique among the redemptive provisions in that it is
available to mortgagors prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings.63
Then comes the first of two principal requirements: “Reinstatement is
effected by curing all defaults then existing, other than payment of such
portion of the principal which would not have been due had no
acceleration occurred, and by paying all costs and expenses required by
the mortgage to be paid in the event of such defaults . . . .”64 Actual
payment of the sums due is the “crucial act” for reinstatement, and this
sentence is the meat of the section, specifying what exactly must be
paid.65 The “defaults then existing” language is straightforward enough;
the mortgagor must pay all outstanding regular payments, save for any
accelerated amounts.66 These amounts are calculated under the loan
documents as written; entering a payment plan, and then paying under
that plan, is not reinstatement because it does not entail the full amounts
due under the loan documents—though it may otherwise be a perfectly
valid settlement.67
It is that second phrase which is more difficult: “all costs and expenses
required by the mortgage to be paid.”68 This logically includes any late

61. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020).
62. See supra note 14 (discussing mechanics of the notice of acceleration).
63. For obvious reasons, judicial commentary on the availability of reinstatement prior to a
lawsuit is rare, but not unknown. N. Cmty. Bank v. 17011 S. Park Ave., 2015 IL App (1st) 133672,
¶¶ 18–20 (accepting without comment that mortgagor could reinstate one month prior to filing, but
rejecting the argument on other grounds). But see Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bryant, 378 N.E.2d
333, 335–36 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1978) (holding that, under prior foreclosure law, reinstatement only
available after suit filed, but ordering reinstatement in equity instead).
64. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020).
65. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Town & Country Assocs., 406 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ill. App. 4th
Dist. 1980).
66. Evergreen Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Barnard, 382 N.E.2d 467, 472–73 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1978).
67. PNC Bank v. Stepney, 2014 IL App (4th) 140078-U, ¶ 31.
68. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020).
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fees on the missed payments, which are, of course, being made late.69 But
it also includes any other expenses incurred for which the mortgage
provides reimbursement—most saliently, attorney’s fees.70 Under the
mortgage, a lender may recover attorney’s fees; to the extent any have
been incurred, the borrower must pay them.71
Finally, reinstatement requires actual payment or tender of the
reinstatement amount.72 Once made, reinstatement occurs automatically,
without further action necessary from either party73:
[P]rovided that such cure and payment are made prior to the expiration
of 90 days from the date the mortgagor or, if more than one, all the
mortgagors
(i) have been served with summons or by publication or
(ii) have otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

69. HSBC Bank USA v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 790 (7th Cir. 2015). To the best of the
author’s knowledge, no state courts have addressed this issue, but the Seventh Circuit’s rationale is
clear and compelling. It is not, however, unanimous: at least one judge has proposed that, because
a reinstatement puts the parties in the position they would have been in had no default occurred,
that no default means no late payments, and therefore no late fees should be included in the cure
amount. Rizzo v. Pierce & Assocs., 351 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2003) (Williams, J., concurring).
This analysis encounters a bootstrapping issue: the late payments are only deemed timely (and thus
any late fees negated) as a result of reinstatement. Up until the point when reinstatement occurs,
however, those payments are still late, and late fees properly assessed. Because the late fees have
accrued, and they are “required to be paid” under the mortgage, they should be validly included in
any reinstatement cure amount.
70. Though the only caselaw on this issue concerns attorney’s fees, the language is broad
enough to cover other costs. Consider a default predicated on failure to insure the property: a
mortgagee could secure force-placed insurance, and then properly include that amount—a cost
required to be paid in case of default—in any reinstatement figure.
71. See, e.g., Harris N.A. v. Chhabria, No. 1-10-1580, 2011 WL 10069432, at *4 (Ill. App. 1st
Dist. June 28, 2011); HSBC Bank USA v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 790 (7th Cir. 2015). Notably,
the prior version of the reinstatement statute, predating the modern IMFL, explicitly provided for
recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees.” ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (1963). The redrafting that
accompanied the IMFL simplified the language, making section 1602 consistent with other
provisions concerning fees. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1510(b) (2020) (permitting
recovery of plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and other costs). This suggests a potential problem: how is a
borrower to know of a lender’s attorney’s fees incurred prior to litigation? Equity suggests this is a
problem for the lender; unless attorney’s fees have been identified and claimed, a borrower would
have no reason to know of them, and tender of all other amounts would discharge all the borrower’s
obligations under the statute, which would be sufficient. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bryant,
378 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1978) (attorney’s fees can be recovered). Caselaw suggests
the most prudent course of action for a borrower would be to pay all claimed amounts, and then
dispute them thereafter. Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Humphries, 703 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
72. N. Cmty. Bank v. 17011 S. Park Ave., 2015 IL App (1st) 133672, ¶¶ 19–20. See also, e.g.,
State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Town & Country Assocs., 406 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ill. App. 4th Dist.
1980). Tender must be legally cognizable. See infra note 113 (discussing sufficiency of tender for
reinstatement).
73. Town & Country Assocs., 406 N.E.2d at 924; K Town, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Co., 171 B.R. 313, 318–19 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
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When service is made by publication, the first date of publication shall
be used for the calculation.74

This is the second of two principal requirements, setting forth the
specific timeline for reinstatement: before ninety days after service
occurs.75 This is a simple calculation, and serves to ensure that
reinstatement occurs early on, if it is to happen at all. Reinstatement is
intended to be useful to borrowers undergoing temporary financial
difficulties, and ninety days from service—which is necessarily at least
thirty days removed from the Notice of Acceleration, which itself may be
well after the first event of default—is as reasonable a cutoff point as
any.76
That last sentence, specifying that the first date of publication is to be
used, is innocent enough, and its meaning is facially clear. It is, however,
somewhat of an anomaly: it was not present in the 1987 revisions that
created the IMFL, but was added thereafter in 1990.77 This makes it the
most recent change to section 1602. And, though not particularly relevant
to section 1602, it forms the basis for the misunderstanding of the
redemption statute upon which this Article is predicated—but more on
that later in Section II.D.
The last provision of the section gives the restatement payment legal
effectivity: “Upon such reinstatement of the mortgage, the foreclosure
and any other proceedings for the collection or enforcement of the
obligation secured by the mortgage shall be dismissed and the mortgage
documents shall remain in full force and effect as if no acceleration or
default had occurred.” Within the context of the IMFL, “shall” language
is mandatory, and not permissive78: if reinstatement occurs, the case must
be dismissed.79 But the statute is not quite done yet, as it has one final
caveat to apply:

74. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.-5/15-1602 (2020) (formatting for clarity).
75. Note that the statute does not say “within 90 days” or similar. Rather, it must happen before
a date 90 days from service. This does not foreclose the possibility of reinstating prior to a
foreclosure case being filed, for service is not a prerequisite, but simply an outer limit. See supra
note 63 (discussing the permissibility of pre-suit reinstatement).
76. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Walker, 437 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ill. 1982) (discussing
motivation for ninety-day period, and finding that it meets rational basis review under special
legislation challenge to constitutionality of reinstatement statute).
77. H.B. 1480, 86th Gen. Assemb., 1989 Sess. (Ill. 1990).
78. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1105(b) (2020). See RBS Citizens v. Ladany, 2011 IL App (1st)
111966-U, ¶ 4 (usual practice is to dismiss upon reinstatement).
79. This provision is as yet unlitigated, but it is likely that, by analogy to the redemption statute,
failure to dismiss a case or otherwise reinstate the loan in a reinstated mortgage may lead to tort or
other liability. See Nelson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, 2014 IL App (5th) 120419-U, ¶ 87 (viable
slander of title claim for failure to release mortgage). See also infra note 116 (failure to release
redeemed mortgage).
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The relief granted by this Section shall not be exhausted by a single use
thereof, but if the court has made an express written finding that the
mortgagor has exercised its right to reinstate pursuant to this Section,
such relief shall not be again available to the mortgagor under the same
mortgage for a period of five years from the date of the dismissal of
such foreclosure . . . .80

And therein lies the catch: reinstatement is only available once every
five years. This limitation is conditioned on courts making an explicit
finding that statutory reinstatement occurred.81 When lenders dismiss
cases for reinstatement, language pursuant to section 1602 is generally
included in the dismissal as a matter of course.82 If the nature of a
reinstatement is disputed, whether the borrower’s payment(s) to the
lender constitute a reinstatement is a question of fact.83 Note, however,
that the five-year period is firm; because the right to reinstate is purely
statutory, courts have no discretion to circumvent the period and order a
reinstatement be accepted anyway.84
80. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020) (formatting and omissions for clarity).
81. The five-year clock only runs from the date the prior case is dismissed, so if reinstatement
occurs prior to a court case being filed, see supra note 63, then it would arguably not apply at all.
There is a logic in this; after all, borrowers can cure under repeated Notices of Acceleration
indefinitely, so permitting serial reinstatement would not be inconsistent with the broader
foreclosure regime. The potential risks for abuse are low; a lender could cut short such a pingponging reinstatement simply by promptly filing suit the next time it happens—and, in the
meantime, the lender is still getting its money.
82. Specifically, the case will be “dismissed pursuant to Section 1602,” or similar. A quick
search of the relevant caselaw reveals a spate of minute dismissal orders from Cook County with
variants of that language. See, e.g., Nation Star Mortg. v. Casimiro, 2019 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 2616 (Cir.
Ct. Cook Co. Aug. 26, 2019). The author is without knowledge as to why electronic database
providers select trivial trial orders for publication, of all things; in Cook County alone, dozens of
similar orders get entered every day. Any reader with particular insight as to how seemingly random
orders make their way to the world at large in this manner is urged to contact the author, as neither
he nor his colleagues have the foggiest idea why it occurs.
83. PNC Bank v. Stepney, 2014 IL App (4th) 140078-U, ¶¶ 30–31. It is admittedly not a difficult
fact question, but it does require the factual finding that the necessary payments were made in the
requisite timeframe. Early commentators on the IMFL’s revisions to the reinstatement statute
suggested that courts should jealously guard the ability to make such a finding, requiring
mortgagees to show good cause to secure such a finding. See, e.g., Eric Freyfogle, The New Roles
in Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 947–48 (1988) (“Clearly, something
more should be required, something that amounts in substance to a showing of good cause to bar
the mortgagor from reinstating again for five years.”); Gnatek, supra note 11, at 483–84
(“Moreover, a good-cause rule would be fair to all parties to the action because courts would
consider a mortgagors’ past behavior and ability to pay in the future, and because upon
reinstatement courts would compensate mortgagees for their damages.”). Courts have uniformly
declined to do so. On the rare occasions they have been called upon to interpret the statute, strict
interpretation has been the rule, entering a finding of reinstatement when the conditions are met,
without further exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Stepney, 2014 IL App (4th) 140078-U, ¶ 31 (noting
that, if properly presented, the reinstatement question would only concern whether statutory
conditions met).
84. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Walker, 437 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ill. 1982) (five-year
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Ultimately, reinstatement offers delinquent borrowers a good statutory
safety valve, permitting those with the means to do so a way to mitigate
the foreclosure early on in the process. It is also the last opportunity for
borrowers to force a lender to reinstate the loan: though they can always
try to negotiate later on, the reinstatement statute is the last guaranteed
method of reinstatement. From here on out, borrowers must either pony
up the entire loan amount, or rely on the lender’s willingness to settle for
something less than what they are owed.85
2. Statutory Redemption
Once a judgment of foreclosure is entered, the borrower has a statutory
opportunity to rescue their property by paying off the entire loan, plus
costs and interest. This is the right of statutory redemption, granted under
section 1603.86 Within the longer of three months from judgment, or
seven months from service, a borrower can redeem by paying the
judgment amount, plus interest. This causes the release of the mortgage,
satisfaction of the debt, and generally has the same effect as any other
payoff of the mortgage—assuming the borrower can collect the necessary
funds.87 Even if redemption never occurs, the redemption timeline
dictates the timing of the foreclosure sale, and is thus a crucial element
of any foreclosure.
i. Historical Developments
Redemption of a foreclosure derives from venerable English law.88 As
feoffments developed into early mortgage instruments,89 they became
limitation does not conflict with court’s equitable power, because when it comes to reinstatements,
courts have no equitable powers). But note that in an appropriate scenario equitable redemption
may still be available. See infra Section I.C.4 (discussing equitable redemption).
85. This is not the end of the line for borrowers; the constellation of loss mitigation options is
vast and constantly shifting, regulated at both the state and federal levels to form a web of programs,
procedures, and practice. Even a cursory discussion of nonstatutory loss mitigation alternatives is
well beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Hannah Costigan-Cowles, Negotiations for the
Home: A Balanced Approach to Good Faith in Foreclosure Mediation, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1571,
1576–81 (common retention and non-retention alternatives to foreclosure). As noted supra note 16,
this is frequent enough; around 70 percent of cases settle out with a voluntary dismissal. See
generally supra note 4 (statistical analysis).
86. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603 (2020).
87. Id. § 15-1603(b)(1), (d)(1), (f)(3).
88. See Milton M. Hermann, Redemptions: The Historical Background, The Modern-Day
Problems of Redemptions, 48 ILL. B.J. 34, 35–36 (1959) (discussing the Court of Chancery giving
relief to a debtor in 1625).
89. A feoffment, of course, is a land deed given in exchange for service, and formed the basis
for its cognate, feudalism. From there, it was a relatively short jump to give a deed in exchange for
uses, which included a penal bond—i.e. payment—and thus the mortgage makes itself known.
Much has been written of this development in the past six hundred years. See generally, e.g.,
Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L.
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more strictly enforced at law.90 Chancellors responded in the late
sixteenth century by granting equitable relief to early mortgagors in cases
of fraud and hardship.91 By the mid–seventeenth century, equitable relief
standardized into redemption, which was allowed as a matter of course.92
The resulting procedure is recognizable as a modern foreclosure.93
Equitable redemption, as part and parcel of the foreclosure process thus
passed into colonial common law, and from there into Illinois.94
The Illinois redemption statute dates to 1825, and permitted a borrower
to redeem for up to twelve months after the sale, and a judgment creditor
for three months thereafter.95 Under this procedure, the sale might occur
and the foreclosure case might be terminated, but the mortgagor’s interest
lingered on.96 Notably, until 1961 the statute applied to any type of
judicial sale of real property, not just foreclosures.97 The statute thus saw
more changes than might otherwise be expected, but it survived a variety
REV. 221, 234–37 (1995) (development of feoffment to uses to evade traditional feudal
obligations).
90. See ROBERT W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 25–26 (1931) (“He gives no hint
of any notion of relief being given to forfeited bonds or mortgages without special circumstances
of hardship being averred and proved.”). This practice was criticized by contemporary playwrights;
Shylock’s proverbial “pound of flesh” functions as satire of strict enforcement. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1.
91. See TURNER, supra note 90, at 24 (“Both cases savoured of fraud, and hence the relief given
was probably on that ground.”).
92. Id. at 29–30. The practice appears to have reached a tipping point between 1615 and 1630,
at which point equitable redemption became standardized and widely accepted. Id. at 28–29; see
also RAYMOND J. WERNER & ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 290 (10th ed. 1992) (“This
right came to be known as the equitable right of redemption, or the equity of redemption.”).
93. Indeed, the linguistic origin of the eponymous “foreclosure” was because the purpose of the
lender’s chancery suit was to terminate—i.e., foreclose—the right of redemption. WERNER &
KRATOVIL, supra note 92. The closest modern analogue to this procedure is the strict foreclosure,
a procedure that Illinois limits to omitted subordinate lien interests only. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/15-1603 (2020).
94. Gnatek, supra note 11, at 475 (citing William C. Prather, Foreclosure of the Security
Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420). See, e.g., Hall v. Augustine Byrne & Co., 2 Ill. 140, 141 (1834)
(defining mortgage by reference to equity of redemption).
95. An Act concerning Judgments and Executions, 1825, §§ 11–12; REVISED CODE OF LAWS,
ILLINOIS, CONTAINING THOSE OF A GENERAL AND PERMANENT NATURE PASSED BY THE SIXTH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AT THEIR SESSION HELD AT VANDALIA, COMMENCING ON THE FIRST
MONDAY OF DECEMBER, 1828, at 88–89 (1827). Note that a number of sources incorrectly date the
redemption statute to later versions, such as an 1879 law. See, e.g., Gnatek, supra note 11, at 485.
Illinois only became an exclusively judicial foreclosure state in 1879, see Prather, supra note 94,
at 445 (“Since 1879 the method of foreclosure has been exclusively by judicial proceedings.”), but
redemption in some form was cognizable before then.
96. For more on the reason underlying this policy decision, see Gnatek, supra note 11, at 486
(explaining the goals of the Illinois redemption statute). As a practical matter, though a mortgagee
could receive a judgment and proceed to sale relatively quickly, they would calculate the amount
due before proceeding to sale, so the redemption amount would be known with certainty. ROGER
FOSTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 999 (4th ed. 1909).
97. Hermann, supra note 88, at 34; see Act of Aug. 7, 1961, 1961 Ill. Laws 2852 (eff. Aug. 7,
1961) (adding foreclosure-specific redemption subdivision); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18(e) (1963).
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of procedural challenges in the wake of the Panic of 1837,98 the Civil
War,99 and the Great Depression.100
Slow as it was, change still came. In 1957, redemption was limited to
twelve months for either mortgagor or creditor;101 in 1961, it shrank again
to the later of twelve months from the judgment of foreclosure or six
months from sale;102 and in 1982 it had reached its final form of six
months from sale for any defendant, borrower or creditor alike.103 Aside
from sundry procedural modifications,104 the core premise of
reinstatement—paying off the judgment amount post-sale—lasted for
more than 160 years.
ii. The Modern Redemption Statute
The 1987 IMFL further limited the redemption period in three ways.
First, only a mortgagor can redeem.105 Second, it shifted away from postsale redemption, requiring that redemption expire before any sale could

98. A related foreclosure-relief statute of 1841, part of a post-Panic procedural relief package,
was struck down by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Act of Feb. 27, 1841,
1841 Ill. Laws 172 (eff. Feb. 27, 1841); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311, 319–20 (1843); see also
Robert M. Lawless, The American Response to Farm Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1037–40 (highlighting the re-emergence of procedural relief statutes).
99. Many states implemented procedural relief statutes at around this time as an attempt to
alleviate economic uncertainty caused by the ravages of the Civil War. Lawless, supra note 98, at
1040 (discussing statutory redemption periods in Alabama and Illinois). The vast majority were
struck down as running afoul of the Union Constitution, the Confederate Constitution, or both. Id.
100. See Prather, supra note 94, at 446 (explaining that the law remained relatively unchanged
for eighty-five years). Unlike affirmative challenges, post-Depression efforts centered on reforming
the foreclosure process to speed disposition of uncontested cases. By and large, they were
unsuccessful at that time. Id.
101. Act of May 24, 1957, 1957 Ill. Laws 280 (eff. May 24, 1957); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77,
§§ 18, 20 (1957). The distinction between mortgagor and creditor redemptions is an odd one, and
the statute’s developments trended towards unifying the timelines. See Kerr v. Miller, 259 Ill. 516,
520–21 (1913) (after twelve months, but before fifteen, borrower engaged in straw transaction to
create judgment creditor for purposes of redemption; this circumvented twelve-month limitation
on borrower redemption, but was permissible). See also E.M.L., Mortgages—Redemption by
Judgment—Creditor, 9 ILL. L. REV. 39, 60–61 (1914–15) (describing this practice as common).
102. Act of Aug. 7, 1961, 1961 Ill. Laws 2852 (eff. Aug. 7, 1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77,
§ 18(e) (1961). See also Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 347–48 (discussing mechanics of
the 1961 law). In this respect Illinois is somewhat of an outlier: most states maintained antebellum
redemption statutes until the early twentieth century but had started paring them down by midcentury. Andra Ghent, How Do Case Law and Statute Differ? Lessons from the Evolution of
Mortgage Law, 57 J.L. & ECON. 1085, 1105 (2014). Illinois’s twelve-month period was on the
longer end to start with, and its reduction was late in coming. See id. at 1106–08 (survey of
nineteenth century redemption periods).
103. P.A. 82-511, 1982 Ill. Laws 2602 (eff. Jan. 1, 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ¶ 12-122
(1985).
104. Such as the redemption statute’s integration into the Code of Civil Procedure in 1981. P.A.
82-280, 1982 Ill. Laws 1382 (eff. July 1, 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, ¶ 12-122 (1985).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-1212 (1987); accord 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1212
(2020) (defining an owner of redemption).
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be held.106 And third, combining those two changes, the redemption
period is now the later of seven months from the date of service or three
months from the date of the judgment of foreclosure.107 All three changes
were substantial at the time,108 but the biggest change is most visible in
hindsight: because the sale cannot happen without the expiry of
redemption, and because a foreclosure without a sale is not particularly
useful, the redemption period directly drives the timeline of a foreclosure
case in a way it had never done before.
Mechanically, the redemption statute lays out a clear procedure. The
mortgagor picks a date during the redemption period on which they
intend to redeem, and must file a Notice of Intent to Redeem at least
fifteen days prior to that date.109 The actual redemption amount is the
amount of the judgment of foreclosure, plus per diem interest from the
date of the judgment, calculated at the mortgage’s rate of interest as if no
default had occurred.110 The mortgagee then has an opportunity to claim
additional costs incurred since the judgment of foreclosure by filing a
certification.111 Costs so certified are added to the redemption amount.112

106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-1507(b) (1987); accord 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1507(b)
(2020) (outlining the sale procedures for a judicial sale).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-1603(b)(1) (1987); accord 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/151603(b)(1) (2020) (defining redemption period).
108. The IMFL, the result of fifty years of criticism of the old foreclosure law, was itself the
subject of much debate and discussion. See generally Gnatek, supra note 11 (discussing changes
in reinstatement and redemption between old and new statutes, and warning of potential conflicts).
109. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(e) (2020). Because the chosen redemption date must be
during the redemption period, and notice must go out at least fifteen days before that redemption
date, the mortgagor must start the redemption process at least fifteen days before the end of the
redemption period. Barrick v. Barrick, 2018 IL App (2d) 170974-U, ¶ 38. Note that the statute
requires that the notice be received fifteen days before the redemption date—perhaps a minor
quibble in a world of electronic notice, see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 11(c) (specifying that documents must
be served electronically unless otherwise specified), but one more hurdle for a redeeming
mortgagor to clear.
110. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(d) (2020). Note that this section identifies six categories
of costs which can go into the judgment of foreclosure: (i) principal and interest, (ii) other costs
allowed by law (e.g., filing fees); (iii) costs and expenses approved by the court (such as receiver
costs); (iv) costs as allowed in the mortgage (such as attorney’s fees), (v) amounts paid to a senior
mortgagee to maintain the lien’s position, and (vi) interest. Id. Curiously, this is the only place in
the IMFL that lays out what a judgment of foreclosure should include; the provisions on judgment
are silent. See id. § 15-1506 (outlining the judgment process).
111. Id. § 15-1603(e). The mortgagee’s notice must be filed at least three days before the
specified redemption date and must be supported by evidence.
112. A mortgagee may fail to include certain expenses in a judgment of foreclosure, by mistake
or otherwise. See BMO Harris Bank v. Wolverine Props., 2015 IL App (2d) 140921, ¶ 27 (failure
to amend judgment prior to sale resulted in inability to collect unintentionally excluded $470,000
tax payment). Following this statutory procedure gives the mortgagee a chance to recover those
fees in redemption. See Order of May 2, 2016, at 8, CitiBank v. Harper, 12 CH 09335 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co. May 2, 2016) (explaining failure to include tax payment in judgment meant it was not
included in redemption amount).
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On the redemption date, and by analogy to a closing date, the
mortgagor can redeem by paying the redemption amount to the
mortgagee.113 If the mortgagee refuses to accept the payment, or the
mortgagor disputes the mortgagee’s certified additional costs, the
mortgagor can pay the entire amount—including any disputed
payment—to the clerk of court, specifying the amount to which the
mortgagor objects.114 The judge can then hear and resolve the objection,
determining whether redemption is properly sought, whether additional
certified costs are warranted, and otherwise determining how to
accomplish the redemption, if at all.115 Finally, once redemption occurs,
the mortgage is to be released and any other necessary steps taken to
memorialize the satisfaction of the debt.116
The redemption statute has value to the mortgagor in what it does, but
its value to the mortgagee lies in when it ends. Presumptively, the
redemption period ends at the later of seven months from service or three
months from judgment.117 This period can be extended by consent of the

113. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(f)(1) (2020). Tender must be facially viable; i.e., it must
be sufficient legal tender. CIT Bank v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 182152-U, ¶ 5 (rejecting bogus
“bill of exchange” as not being legal tender); see also Joiner v. SVM Mgmt., LLC, 2020 IL 124671,
¶¶ 37–46 (exhaustively describing tender). Unsurprisingly, this basic requirement serves to filter
the wheat from the chaff, and only tends to trip up sovereign citizens, whose pseudolegal theories
and fetishization of tender and security instruments does not serve them well. See generally Francis
X. Sullivan, The “Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal Theories of the
Sovereign Citizen Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785 (legal framework of sovereign citizen
theories); id. at 811 n.144 (notions of tender). That is, to the extent such litigants engage with the
legal system at all—some sovereign citizen activities are best described as ritual or magic, rather
than law. See generally David Griffin, Truth Language: The Pseudolegal Discourse of the
Sovereign Citizen Movement (2017) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Cardiff University School of
English, Communication and Philosophy) (on file with author) (analyzing sovereign citizen
theories in legal framework by reference to ritual and magic).
114. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(f)(2) (2020).
115. Id. § 15-1603(g) (discussing the procedure to take upon objection). See, e.g., Johnson,
2019 IL App (1st) 182152-U, ¶ 5 (ruling that mortgagee’s rejection of facially insufficient tender
was not rejection within the meaning of section 1603, because it was not legal tender).
116. § 15-1603(f)(3) (explaining what steps the clerk takes after payment). Once redemption
occurs, the rest of the process is automatic and mandatory. Failure to release a redeemed mortgage
gives rise to liability under the Mortgage Act. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 905/4 (2020) (requiring a $200
statutory penalty for failure to release mortgage instrument within one month); Nelson v. Bayview
Loan Servicing, 2014 IL App (5th) 120419-U, ¶¶ 48–55 (affirming liability under Mortgage Act
for failure to release). Depending on the circumstances of the failure to release, it may also create
a slander of title claim. See Nelson, 2014 IL App (5th) 120419-U, ¶ 87 (slander claim cognizable,
but under those facts, duplicative of Mortgage Act claim).
117. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).
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lender,118 by order of court,119 or by operation of law.120 But such
extensions are tightly guarded, and courts take a dim view of attempts to
circumvent the redemption period.121 This is because the expiry of
redemption is permanent: once expired, regardless of the reason, it can

118. This can occur by agreement, though it would be more common to either agree to stay
entry of judgment or negotiate loss mitigation directly. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Zimmers,
2012 Ill. App. (2d) 110393-U, ¶¶ 2, 5 (featuring parties that agreed to extend redemption by sixty
days). It can also happen by accident; in the author’s experience, redemption dates are often handwritten into prepared judgment orders, and scrivener’s errors may set a longer date than the statute
requires. Unless corrected—which can be done easily enough nunc pro tunc—the extended date
would be binding. Either way, because the temporal limitation on foreclosure is a benefit to the
mortgage, it is theirs to waive. Household Bank v. Lewis, 890 N.E.2d 934, 940 (Ill. 2008).
119. § 15-1603(c)(2). It is unclear what circumstances would warrant judicial extension of
statutory redemption, as the IMFL grants a court no authority to extend it. Mountain States Mortg.
Ctr. v. Allen, 628 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1993). Section 1603 even specifically
provides that staying the effect of a judgment of foreclosure will not stop the redemption clock.
§ 15-1603(c)(1). Where a trial court wishes to extend redemption on purely equitable grounds, it is
the author’s experience that the preferred method is to delay entry of the judgment of foreclosure,
thus permitting redemption to run three months from that future date of judgment.
120. § 15-1603(c)(2). Note that the author has yet to find a statute that mandates a stay of
redemption. Neither filing a bankruptcy petition nor the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay
provision will affect the redemption clock. § 15-1603(c)(1); Bank of Am. v. Z Fin. Il. G Props. (In
re County Treasurer), 2016 IL App (1st) 150371-U, ¶ 29 (bankruptcy stay prohibits affirmative acts
against an estate, but expiry of redemption is not an affirmative act); accord NNN Cypresswood
Drive 25 v. WBCMT 2007-C33 Office 9729, 517 B.R. 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (similar analysis
under similar Texas statute). But see In re Tynan, 773 F.2d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
under prior foreclosure statute, filing of bankruptcy petition stayed redemption sixty days under
11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) (2020) (validity called into question by In re Kohler, 107 B.R. 167, 169 n.2
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989)).
121. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Morris, 2018 IL App (2d) 170116-U, ¶¶ 28–29 (noting
that a motion to reconsider will not stay redemption); Colon v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 319 F.3d
912, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 11 U.S.C. 1322(c)(1) (2020)) (recognizing that a broadly
worded bankruptcy cure provision will not apply to expand redemption).
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never be revived.122 And once redemption expires, the foreclosure sale
must follow.123
The redemption procedure is technical and precise, requiring a
mortgagor’s specific compliance with tight deadlines. In practice, the
specific statutory procedure is almost never used.124 Lenders routinely
waive strict compliance, often accepting late redemption; they can even
decline to confirm a judicial sale in lieu of accepting a late redemption.125
This is because, while the right of redemption benefits the mortgagor, the
conditions on that right, including virtually all statutory limits on
redemption, benefit the mortgagee, who may freely waive them.126 And
this makes sense: a redemption necessarily brings in the judgment
amount, plus interests and costs. That guaranteed payment will usually
be much more attractive to a lender than recovering value through a short
sale.127
122. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(c)(1) (2020). See Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey, 2013
IL 115469, ¶ 25 (construing interaction of default and sale provisions based on the principle that a
borrower should not be allowed to revive redemption); Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Ogbonna,
2019 IL App (1st) 181559-U, ¶ 25 (finding that, even if redemption was improperly shortened, the
appellate court would not revive the redemption period on remand); Margaretten & Co. v. Martinez,
550 N.E.2d 8, 9–10 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1990) (holding that, while the redemption period was
improperly calculated, it could not be revived). If this limitation was not enough, a mortgagor has
an additional hurdle: unless the mortgagor actually attempted to redeem, they will not have suffered
any prejudice, and any error in the redemption process would likely be harmless. Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Tr. v. Paige, 2013 IL App (1st) 120715-U, ¶ 21. The only possible method to revive
redemption would be to reset one of the two prongs of the process: either successfully quash service
or vacate the judgment of foreclosure. Either method would result in the redemption clock never
running in the first place. See Morris, 2018 IL App (2d) 170116-U, ¶¶ 28–29 (suggesting that, if a
motion to reconsider successfully vacated judgment of foreclosure, redemption would remain in
play). In such a situation, even if a court ruled that statutory redemption was not available, a
borrower could likely access equitable redemption on the same terms as if statutory redemption
had been revived. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1605 (2020) (describing when equitable
redemption is not available); infra Section I.C.4 (discussing equitable redemption).
123. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(h) (2020); accord id. § 15-1507(a). The sale may occur
at any time after redemption expires but is usually scheduled immediately after redemption’s
expiry—often the very next day.
124. Usually, a borrower will ask for a payoff letter. The lender will generate a letter, and if the
borrower pays the requested amount by the given date, the loan is paid off—i.e. redeemed.
Institutional pressures on both sides favor such less formal payoffs because protracted litigation
costs both sides time and money. See Robert Kratovil, Mortgage Law Today, 13 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 251, 251–52 (1980) (arguing that extrajudicial settlement is facilitated by both
institutionalization and standardization of mortgage lending).
125. Household Bank v. Lewis, 890 N.E.2d 934, 936 (Ill. 2008). See also, e.g., Fleet Mortg.
Corp. v. Deale, 678 N.E.2d 35, 36, 38–39 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1997) (upholding redemption in lieu
of sale, where mortgagee accepted untimely redemption amount); Order of May 2, 2016, supra
note 112, at 3–4 (holding that the plaintiff waived strict compliance by providing payoff letter and
accepting tender directly, despite failure to file Notice of Intent to Redeem).
126. Lewis, 890 N.E.2d at 940.
127. Usually. Because of the complexities of financial instruments, their securitization, and
their servicing, different mortgagees (or entities acting as mortgagees) may have very different
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Statutory redemption contains multitudes, and it is a powerful tool for
the borrower to force the lender’s hand and undo foreclosure
proceedings.128 Even though borrowers rarely redeem property, formally
or otherwise, the importance of the redemption statute cannot be
understated. Because all cases necessarily pass through the redemption
process, the timelines set by the redemption statute touch on every case,
however lightly.
3. Special Right of Redemption
After statutory redemption expires, a sale will be held—but after the
sale, the borrower still has one last chance to redeem. Section 1604
provides that, starting at sale and running until thirty days after
confirmation, a borrower can redeem by paying off the sale price, plus
costs and interest.129 But this mechanism is only available where the
lender repurchases the property at sale, and the sale price is less than the
outstanding debt, resulting in a deficiency.130 Whereas statutory
redemption is generally applicable, this right is not: hence, special
redemption.
Because special redemption is much more restricted than statutory
redemption, its procedure is more straightforward. A borrower wishing
to specially redeem must pay the sum of the sale price, any of the lender’s
outstanding costs and expenses, and statutory interest from the date of
sale.131 Payment is to be made directly to the lender.132 Unlike statutory
redemption, special redemption has no procedure for the borrower to
dispute costs, or essentially escrow the balance with the clerk of court.
This is because, once sale occurs, the report of sale must be “promptly”
filed with the court; the report of sale will identify the sale price and all
costs down to the cent.133 Statutory interest is a simple arithmetic

incentives when it comes to loss mitigation such as accepting a late redemption. See CW Capital
Asset Mgmt. v. Chi. Props., 610 F.3d 497, 499–500 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing, in an opinion
penned by Judge Posner, securitization and differential loss mitigation incentives for different
tranche-holders of mortgage-backed securities).
128. See HSBC Bank USA v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating broadly the
mechanics of redemption).
129. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1604(a) (2020).
130. Id.
131. Id. Additional costs here are de rigueur, as this is the only way for plaintiffs to recover
costs such as publication of the sale and the selling officer’s commission—costs that are necessarily
incurred after judgment, and therefore can never be included in that judgment. Note further that
interest in special redemption is statutory from the date of sale, rather than based on the mortgage;
this acknowledges that special redemption is one step farther removed from the loan. Compare id.
§ 15-1604(a), with id. § 15-1603(d)(1).
132. Id. § 15-1604(a).
133. See id. § 15-1508(a) (requiring a report of sale).
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calculation from those known quantities.134 Once property is specially
redeemed, the lender must transfer the property to the borrower.135
As noted, however, special redemption is limited to foreclosure sales
where the bid price was lower than the judgment amount. This means
that, if a borrower specially redeems, there will necessarily be an
outstanding debt equal to the difference between the sale price and
judgment.136 This debt remnant remains on the property as an in rem
deficiency, and though the property has been returned to the borrower,
the outstanding debt simply turns into a judgment lien.137 Indeed, if a
borrower specially redeems, all outstanding liens are simply turned into
judgment liens, with the same priority order as before.138 The borrower
may have their property back, but their situation is still precarious—if the
outstanding amounts are not satisfied, the former mortgagee might simply
start a new foreclosure on their new judgment lien.139
Historically, the general statutory redemption provision persisted for
six months following a sale. When the IMFL restructured the foreclosure
process to eliminate post-sale redemption generally, it added special

134. Id. § 2-1303(a) (setting a nine percent statutory interest rate on civil judgments). See
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. v. Paige, 2013 IL App (1st) 120715-U, ¶¶ 35–36 (holding that the specially
redeeming defendant was not entitled to accounting).
135. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1604(b). This either involves assigning the certificate of sale,
which is redeemable for a judicial deed, see id. § 15-1507(f), or simply executing a subsequent
deed from that judicial deed.
136. Theoretically, if the sale price was barely below judgment, the sale price plus interest and
cost could top the outstanding judgment. Nevertheless, because the payment is directed towards the
sale price, costs, and interest, the outstanding balance would still remain as a lien—despite the
borrower’s final payment being slightly above that amount. Such marginal cases are an unfortunate
consequence; the longer a borrower waits to redeem, the worse off they may end up. See, e.g.,
Paige, 2013 IL App (1st) 120715-U, ¶¶ 35–36 (recognizing that the defendant was not entitled to
take credit against the special redemption amount for payments made because the statute does not
account for such credit).
137. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/15-1604(b) (2020).
138. This conclusion is somewhat counterintuitive, but statutorily sound. Any outstanding
junior liens would have been reduced to judgment liens by operation of the judgment of foreclosure.
Id. § 15-1506(i)(1). Those liens (but not the underlying debts) would normally be extinguished by
confirmation of sale. Id. But the special redemption statute specifically provides that the lender’s
reconveyance to the borrower is “subject only to those encumbrances that would normally arise on
title if a redemption were made under Section 15-1603.” Id. § 15-1604(b). Because any redemption
under section 1603 necessarily occurs before the foreclosure sale, junior liens would still exist as
judgment liens at the time of a section 1603 redemption. Thus, the “encumbrances that would
normally arise” language in section 1604 operates as an exception to section 1506’s lienextinguishment provisions. This statutory interaction has not been tested in court but is the only
logical interpretation: to allow otherwise would permit a borrower to abuse the special redemption
procedure to extinguish junior liens on the property.
139. Junior lienors would naturally complicate things further: default on a senior mortgage is
universally accepted as a default on a junior, so though any mortgage liens may have been converted
to judgment liens, see supra note 138, the juniors will probably not be happy about the involuntary
downgrading of their security interest.
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redemption so as to preserve that small vestige of the old.140 Though it is
incongruous with the remainder of the IMFL’s redemptive provisions, the
special right of redemption adds little by way of overhead to the
foreclosure process. It extends post-sale, but only for thirty days.141 For
other practical reasons, nothing would happen during that thirty-day
period anyway. The trial court retains primary jurisdiction, so a motion
to reconsider or to quash service could upend the foreclosure.142 An
appeal could be filed.143 The IMFL’s own deed-vesting provisions
provide that no subsequent purchaser is a proverbial bona fide purchaser
for value unless and until that appellate period passes.144 Not even the
eviction order can take effect during that time.145
In other words, because as a practical matter the lender wouldn’t be
doing anything with their newly purchased property during that thirty day
period, granting the borrower one last-ditch option to redeem would not
disrupt the normal foreclosure process.146 The lender loses nothing by
way of such redemption: not only do they get the bid price plus costs and
statutory interest, but they also retain a judgment lien for the balance.
Ultimately, the principal barrier to the borrower is the same under special

140. See Gnatek, supra note 11, at 484–85 (describing special redemption as the only exception
to IMFL’s bar on post-sale redemption). Special redemption has undergone only one statutory
change, a modification in 1989 to account for the survival of junior liens, see supra note 138, as
part of one of several “cleanup” bills that followed on the heels of the IMFL itself. P.A. 86-974,
1989 Ill. Laws 6578 (eff. July 1, 1990).
141. As with most other redemptive rights, this period can be extended by agreement of the
parties. In re Scheldt, 220 B.R. 362, 363 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998). It can also be extended to sixty
days by operation of the Bankruptcy Code if a borrower files a Chapter 13 during the special
redemption period. In re Snowden, 345 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 108(b) (2020)). See also In re McKenith, 428 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that
a Chapter 13 plan cannot extend the special redemption window beyond the sixty-day period).
142. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(a) (2020). After a sale occurs, borrowers challenging the
case on its merits must necessarily seek to set aside the sale. Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey, 2013
IL 115469, ¶ 18. This imposes a high burden, as there are only very limited grounds on which to
do so. Id. (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b) (2020)). Even section 1401 proceedings are
limited by other provisions. U.S. Bank v. Prabhakaran, 2013 IL App (1st) 111224, ¶¶ 29–30 (relief
barred by deed-vesting provisions of 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1509 (2020)). For more on these
interactions, see generally Cecilia A. Horan, Mortgage Foreclosure Relief, 108 ILL. B.J. 38 (2020)
(comprehensive discussion of framework for vacating judgments).
143. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 303(a)(1).
144. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1509(a) (2020).
145. Id. § 15-1508(g). Though a strict reading of the statute would only bar prosecution of an
eviction for thirty days, it is the current practice of the Cook County Sheriff to not permit an order
approving sale to be placed for eviction until after the period ends.
146. It is the longstanding public policy of the state to promote certainty in judicial sales. E.g.,
McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 25; Conover v. Musgrave, 68 Ill. 58, 62 (1873). Indeed, the
elimination of post-sale redemption in the IMFL was meant to serve this end. Gnatek, supra note
11, at 486–87. Because special redemption is limited to cases where the lender repurchased, these
traditional policy concerns simply don’t apply. Special redemption will never disincentivize a third
party from bidding on property, because a third party bid bars special redemption.
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redemption as statutory: actually coming up with the money, a problem
no statute could ever resolve.147
4. Equitable Redemption
The fourth and final mechanism is also the oldest: equitable
redemption. Because it derives from the trial court’s inherent equitable
powers, the IMFL does not so much provide for it as account for it,
limiting equitable redemption in two main ways. First, section 1605
provides that a judicial sale extinguishes any equitable redemption.148
And second, in providing a comprehensive battery of statutory
redemptive mechanisms, the IMFL as a whole makes equitable
redemption largely redundant. As a result, equitable redemption is
virtually unknown in the modern foreclosure context.
Historically, redemption originated as a way for the chancery court to
offer relief to mortgagors; equitable redemption was the only
redemption.149 Illinois codified such equitable relief in 1825, barely six
years after statehood;150 if purely equitable redemption ever saw use,
extant sources do not clearly record it.151 Equity persisted under statutory
redemption, whereby courts retained discretion to modify the length of
the statutory redemption period, as circumstances required.152 As the
statute grew more comprehensive, equity became less necessary; by the
twentieth century, courts would strictly enforce the statutory period,
though they would happily enforce oral agreements to extend that

147. Whereas statutory reinstatement and statutory redemption are merely rare and exceedingly
rare, respectively, special redemption is personally unknown in the experience of the author, his
colleagues, and every practitioner with whom he has consulted. Post-sale settlements generally,
however, are rare but not unknown. E.g., Household Bank v. Lewis, 890 N.E.2d 934, 936 (Ill. 2008)
(involving a lender that vacated its own sale to accept full payoff).
148. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1605 (2020).
149. See supra Section I.C.2.i (discussing the historical background of the redemption statute).
150. An Act Concerning Judgments and Executions, §§ 11, 12 (eff. May 1, 1825); REVISED
CODE OF LAWS, ILLINOIS, CONTAINING THOSE OF A GENERAL AND PERMANENT NATURE PASSED
BY THE SIXTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AT THEIR SESSION HELD AT VANDALIA, COMMENCING ON
THE FIRST MONDAY OF DECEMBER, 1828, at 88–89 (1827).
151. The first unambiguous reference to redemption in reported caselaw comes in Hall v.
Augustine Byrne & Co., 2 Ill. 140, 141 (1834). Hall discusses the mortgagor’s equity of redemption
but does so by reference to the Act Concerning Judgments and Executions, i.e. the 1825 redemption
statute. It is likely that the mortgagor’s equity to which the Hall court refers is the statutory right.
152. Bremer v. Calumet & Chi. Canal & Dock Co., 18 N.E. 312, 322 (Ill. 1889) (“The usual
time allowed is six months, but that is not obligatory in all cases.”); see, e.g., Decker v. Patton, 11
N.E. 897, 897 (Ill. 1887) (describing a twelve-month redemption); Rodman v. Quick, 75 N.E. 465,
466 (Ill. 1905) (involving a ninety-day redemption).
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period.153 By midcentury, courts appear to have lost discretion to
equitably extend the redemption period at all.154
The first limitation the 1987 IMFL imposed was to explicitly provide
that no equitable right of redemption would exist after a judicial sale.155
That original language, unchanged today, was part of the IMFL’s broader
move away from post-sale redemption: because all statutory redemptive
rights expire at sale, it was logical to foreclose the use of equitable relief
to circumvent the redemption period.156 Thus, if equitable redemption is
available, chances are that there exists another, better method—either
reinstatement, which is substantially cheaper; or statutory redemption,
which lays out a clear procedure that does not require the borrower to
drag the lender to court to force an equitable redemption. Coupled with
lenders’ willingness to accept untimely redemptions anyway,157 as a
practical matter, equitable redemption is simply redundant.158
The second limitation is one implicit to the structure of the IMFL.
Taken together, the procedures for reinstatement, statutory redemption,
and special redemption cover the vast majority of circumstances in which
a borrower would want to exercise a redemptive right. There simply isn’t
that much left where purely equitable relief is necessary. No appellate
case arising under the IMFL reports the use of equitable redemption;
cases may discuss its existence, but all adjudicate the case at bar on other
grounds.159 It is utterly unknown to the experience of the author, his
153. Taggart v. Blair, 74 N.E. 372, 375 (Ill. 1905); see also, e.g., Benckendorf v. Streator Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 111 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1953) (enforcing oral agreement to
extend redemption period).
154. See Weiner v. Eder, 176 N.E.2d 777, 778 (Ill. 1961) (involving a redemption check
tendered on last day of redemption period, but because the check did not clear until after the period
expired, redemption was not proper—with no suggestion that equity could salvage the attempt).
155. P.A. 84-1462, 1986 Ill. Laws 4360 (eff. July 1, 1987); see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/151605 (2020). Prior to the IMFL, such a barrier was implicit. First Ill. Nat’l Bank v. Hans, 493
N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1986) (under prior foreclosure law, equitable redemption
“generally” lasted until sale).
156. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020) (statutory reinstatement); Id. § 15-1603(b)(1)
(statutory redemption). See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 25
(demonstrating that IMFL’s specific prohibitions on reviving reinstatement and redemption periods
should not be circumvented).
157. See supra Section I.B.2 (discussing that lenders generally seek out and accept otherwise
untimely reinstatements and redemptions).
158. In this respect, equitable redemption did not see much use in the later days of the pre-IMFL
regime either, as other mechanisms largely displaced it. Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at
337–39.
159. The closest the caselaw comes is React Financial v. Long, 852 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. App. 3d
Dist. 2006), where the junior lienor failed to equitably redeem—but the question there centered not
on the expiration of equitable redemption, which all parties took for granted, but rather what its
effects were. Id. at 280–81. However unlikely, it is possible that a case exists under a different
name; courts occasionally mis-cite the various redemptive mechanisms of the IMFL. E.g., Lowry
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colleagues, and those members of the Bar with whom he has consulted.
At most, equitable redemption provides a court a way to incorporate
equitable principles into a discussion of other redemptive mechanisms,
and thus offers a backstop, authorizing deviation from the strict terms of
the statute where equity demands.160
It is difficult to imagine a case where equitable redemption is truly the
only option available to a borrower, largely because the right is
extinguished at sale. Such a scenario could be constructed, though it
would likely involve egregious facts: if, for instance, the lender
deliberately miscalculated the redemption period to expire early and then
rushed to sale, that sale would cut off any equitable relief.161 The sale
might be subject to vacation under section 1508’s justice provision, but
statutory redemption—even if miscalculated—could not be revived.162
After vacating the sale, a court could order a mortgagor to take equitable
redemption.163 But even then, equitable redemption would not be so
much a standalone mechanism as a way to copy in equity what the letter
of the statute would not otherwise permit as a way to correct a clear
injustice.164
Even at its zenith, equitable redemption under the IMFL is dependent
on and parallels statutory redemption. Because it terminates at sale and is
generally more cumbersome than the statutory mechanisms, it is
impractical and not particularly effective. Equitable redemption is
technically still available under the IMFL, but, aside from egregious or
otherwise fringe cases, it is not a factor in modern foreclosure practice.
v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 15-C-4433, 2016 WL 4593815, at *12 (quoting the special right of
redemption, section 1604, as section 1603).
160. See Order of May 2, 2016, supra note 112, at 3–4 (relying on combination of plaintiff’s
waiver and “interests of justice” to justify lack of strict compliance with statutory redemption
procedure).
161. Margaretten & Co. v. Martinez, 550 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1990) (holding that
equitable redemption was unavailable post-sale, even where statutory redemption was
miscalculated).
162. Id.; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b) (2020) (stating the grounds to deny
confirmation of judicial sale); see also, e.g., Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Ogbonna, 2019 IL
App (1st) 181559-U, ¶ 25 (involving a statutory redemption period which was improperly
shortened, but expired, and the appellate court declined to revive it); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. v.
Paige, 2013 IL App (1st) 120715-U, ¶ 21 (holding that any redemption error was harmless because
the defendant made no attempt to redeem).
163. Section 1508’s justice provision is a notoriously difficult threshold to meet. See NAB Bank
v. LaSalle Bank, 2013 IL App (1st) 121147, ¶¶ 16–19 (recognizing that the court’s discretion to
deny confirmation is “extraordinarily narrow”). That said, virtually the only reported circumstances
permitting vacation of a sale involved a lender’s misconduct. Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey,
2013 IL 115469, ¶ 26. Ordering equitable redemption is a major action, but so too is vacating a sale
under the justice provision.
164. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bryant, 378 N.E.2d 333, 335–36 (Ill. App. 5th Dist.
1978) (holding that, under prior foreclosure law, reinstatement was only available after suit was
filed, but ordering reinstatement in equity instead).
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II. THE MEASURE OF REDEMPTION
The redemption statute provides an unambiguous calculation of the
redemption period in almost all cases. The sole exception is where service
is by publication, which runs for three weeks. The proper calculation of
the statutory redemption period begins with the third publication. This
conclusion can be reached in a number of ways, but they break into two
primary categories.
First, the plain language of the redemption statute conditions the
redemption period on the completion of service by publication. The plain
language of the publication statute, in turn, evidences that service is
completed only on the third publication. These conclusions find support
in the historical record and development of service by publication.
Second, the redemption statute’s calculation language is modeled on
that of the reinstatement statute. Comparing the two statutes directly
demonstrates that only one reading is consistent with the language of the
statutes and core tenets of statutory construction: the redemption period
must run from the third publication, rather than the first.
A. Calculating Redemption
The length of the redemption period is straightforward, and is subject
to the usual principles of statutory calculation. Because a judgment of
foreclosure sets an unambiguous redemption period, calculating
redemption from such a judgment is a useful exercise to identify the
principles involved. Calculating redemption from publication is more
ambiguous, and results in two alternative dates, based on whether the first
or third date of publication is used.
1. Redemption from a Judgment of Foreclosure
The first of two potential statutory redemption calculations provides
that “the redemption period shall end on . . . the date 3 months from the
date of entry of a judgment of foreclosure.”165 The three-month period is
by far the most common redemption calculation. Because redemption
calculations involve day-by-day precision, it is worth examining what,
exactly, “3 months” means.
It is tempting to calculate the three-month period in a number of
different ways: by counting out ninety days, somewhat by analogy to the
reinstatement timeline;166 by adding three calendar months, plus a day;

165. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).
166. Reinstatement is explicitly given as “90 days.” Id. § 15-1602.
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adding perhaps two or three days, if the period includes February; and so
forth.167 All of these methods are incorrect.168
The proper calculation is a strict calculation from the calendar day in
one month to the corresponding number in the third month thereafter.
Thus, a judgment entered on January 14 should provide that the
redemption period ends on April 14.169 This is because the redemption
statute is framed in terms of months, rather than days.170 If the target
month does not have as many days as the month the judgment was
entered, redemption ends on the last date of the month regardless.171
Thus, a judgment entered November 30 does not expire February 30
(which does not exist) or March 2 (to account for February being two
days short), but instead on February 28.172 As with all statutory
calculations, if the last date is a weekend of legal holiday, it is extended
by operation of law to the next business day.173
This calculation mechanism—from one calendar day to another—
holds for every redemption period. When calculated as three months from
the date of judgment, the math is trivial, because the judgment, a court
order, is entered on a specific date. Likewise, if the mortgagor is served
with summons or submits to personal jurisdiction, because either event is
167. In the author’s experience, “three months plus a day” seems most common, but most
calculations (reasonably) tend to err on the side of a longer, rather than shorter, period. See, e.g.,
Order of Aug. 9, 2019, at 6–7, Fannie Mae v. Barrett, 2019 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 505 (Cir. Ct. Cook. Co.
Aug. 9, 2019) (redemption expires November 11, 2019, i.e., three months and two days).
168. Which is not to say that a redemption period so set would necessarily be wrong: a lender
can always set longer redemption. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
169. Note that section 1603 provides that the period “shall end on” that date. 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020). Many judgments use “shall expire on” language, or similar. See,
e.g., Order of Aug. 9, 2019, supra note 167, at 6–7. “Expire” may suggest that the right cannot be
exercised on that final date, which is incorrect. See Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Deale, 678 N.E.2d 35, 36
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1997) (involving a redemption made on last date of the period); 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/1.11 (2020) (“The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be
computed by excluding the first day and including the last . . . .”). It would be preferable to simply
mirror the statute’s language and provide that the right “ends on” the appropriate date certain.
170. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1.10 (2020) (statute on statutes). See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 181
N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ill. 1962) (describing the seminal interpretation of “month” as used in statutory
construction).
171. See Gilbert, 181 N.E.2d at 203–04 (collecting cases).
172. It expires on February 29 in a leap year, because that would be the last day of the month.
Leap days are generally relevant only when time periods are to be calculated in days. E.g., People
v. Hazzard, 2016 IL App (1st) 141356-U, ¶ 35 (crediting criminal defendant with a leap day for
number of days spent in presentence custody). When discussing months or years, the extra day is
largely irrelevant. See, e.g., Cella v. Sanitary Dist. Emps.’ & Trs.’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 639
N.E.2d 1335, 1343 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1994) (when calculating yearly salary, leap year argument
“is very attractive, but it is a ‘red herring’”).
173. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1.11 (2020). See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Keefe, 407 N.E.2d 864,
866–67 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1980) (demonstrating that, under prior foreclosure statute, where
redemption was calculated to end on a Sunday, the payment was properly made on the following
Monday).
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fixed to a date certain, the redemption period—there, seven months174—
is easily ascertainable.
2. Redemption from Service by Publication
Of the various starting points for the redemption calculation, only
publication does not occur on a single date. It in fact occurs on three:
publication requires that the notice be published at least once a week for
three successive weeks.175 Redemption could thus be calculated from
either the first or the third publication date.176
Service by publication177 is a two-step process. First, the plaintiff files
an affidavit stating that the defendant has left the state, cannot be found,
or is otherwise unable to be served.178 Then, the plaintiff may publish a
legal notice in the appropriate county newspaper, which must be
published once each week for three consecutive weeks.179 The clerk of
court then mails a copy of the notice to each address of record.180 This

174. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).
175. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-207 (2020).
176. Or, theoretically, any date in between, such as the second publication date. To the author’s
knowledge, such an argument would be novel; only the first and third dates are legally meaningful.
In any event, the answer proposed by this Article—that only the third date may be used—displaces
all other calculations.
177. All other forms of service require a summons: the “process” that is served. E.g., 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-203(a)) (2020) (personal service); id. § 2-203.2 (inmate); id. § 2-204 (corporate);
id. § 2-205(a) (partnership); id. § 2–211 (municipalities). Publication is of a notice, not the
summons; it does not (nor could it reasonably) include a complaint. Id.; compare id. 5/2-2206, with
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 104(a) (all summonses must include complaint). It could be argued that “service
by publication” is a misnomer, as publication is not service at all—it is perfectly legally effective
at securing personal jurisdiction for an in rem or quasi in rem action, but it is not technically “service
of process.” This Article is technical enough in other respects, and simply adopts the common
phrasing of “service by publication” for a jurisdictional publication event.
178. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a-5). (2020). Subsection (a-5), which specifically governs
publication in mortgage foreclosure actions, is a new addition in 2020; previously, mortgage
foreclosure publications went through subsection (a). P.A. 101-0539 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020). The new
subsection’s changes are minor, and do not change the overall publication process. Compare 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a) (2020), with id. § 2-206(a-5).
179. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a-5) (2020) (plaintiff to cause publication); id. § 2-207
(three-week period). Though the statute does not require it to be the same day each week, as a
practical matter is always is, because it is easier and simpler to do so.
180. Id. As a practical matter, this mailing provides the most notice a defendant is likely to
receive. In this day and age, legal notices in a newspaper are unlikely to be read by anyone for any
reason. And yet, publication is accepted as sufficient service. See, e.g., Aurora Loan Servs. v. Black,
2012 IL App (1st) 111698-U, ¶ 24 (finding service proper even if defendants had no chance to read
notice). Service by publication is ouroboric: publication serves no modern purpose other than to be
published. The practical purpose of service by publication as a concept is not what it once was, and
sooner or later, the statutory scheme will need to be revisited. See, e.g., William Wagner & Joshua
R. Castillo, Friending Due Process: Facebook as a Fair Method of Alternative Service, 19
WIDENER L. REV. 259, 260–61 (2013) (arguing that due process must adapt to the times).
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initiates the thirty-day clock after which a party against whom publication
is had is in technical default.181
It is the common practice of foreclosing plaintiffs to calculate
redemption based on the first of the three publications, rather than the
third.182 Thus, if publication occurs on January 7, 14, and 21, redemption
calculated from the first date would end on August 7.
The proper calculation of redemption runs from the third date of
publication, rather than the first. Thus, if publication runs on the same
dates of January 7, 14, and 21, redemption properly calculated from the
third date would end on August 21, a full fortnight later.
Choosing between these interpretations requires parsing the text of
section 1603, which provides that “the redemption period shall end on the
later of (i) the date 7 months from the date the mortgagor . . . [has] been
served with summons or by publication.”183 The language can be
addressed either by reference to the publication process itself, or to the
remainder of the IMFL. Either analysis leads to the same conclusion: the
third date of publication should be used.
B. Completing Service by Publication
Section 1603 provides that the redemption period is to run after service
is complete. This conclusion is compelled both by the wording of section
1603 itself and by the operation of its other service provisions.
Furthermore, where service is by publication, that service is complete
only after the third publication occurs. The publication statute’s exception
concerning default judgments does not change this outcome, and an
examination of the statute’s history demonstrates that those exceptions
cannot and should not affect the redemption calculation itself.
1. Section 1603 Requires Completed Service
The plain language of section 1603 requires service to be completed
before redemption runs. Service by publication, in turn, requires all three
publications to be complete. The only permissible interpretation of the
statute is that the redemption period can only run from the third
publication.
181. Local rules, however, may limit the ability of a plaintiff to seek a default judgment on that
timeframe. See General Administrative Order 2012-10 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Oct. 17, 2012) (creating
the sixty-day rule). By and large, local rules governing the mechanics of how a foreclosure case is
actually prosecuted do not affect the legal point of how redemption is to be calculated, and this
Article generally omits discussion of same.
182. See infra Section III.A (discussing scope of problem).
183. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020). The omitted text simply requires service to
be had on all mortgagors. Because the calculation with respect to a single publication does not
change if multiple publications occur, for simplicity’s sake this Article collapses the publication
analysis to a hypothetical single mortgagor.
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i. Plain Language of Section 1603
The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is also its most
intuitive: the best evidence of what a statute means is its plain
language.184 Where that language is clear, it should be applied directly.185
Here, section 1603 provides that redemption ends seven months from
when “the mortgagor or, if more than one, all the mortgagors have been
served with summons or by publication.”186 The verb form here, “have
been served” is in the present perfect tense,187 which grammatically
requires the action at issue—here, the date of service by publication—to
have been completed before the relevant subject timeframe—here, the
running of redemption.188 The grammatical conjugation of the statute’s
language does not permit of an interpretation where both service and
redemption occur simultaneously.189 In other words, the plain language
of section 1603 requires service by publication to be complete before the
redemption period begins to run.

184. E.g., Lakewood Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 2019 IL 124019, ¶ 17.
This principle of statutory construction is ancient, in Illinois and elsewhere. E.g., Lockridge v.
Nuckolls, 25 Ill. 159, 162 (1861) (interpreting similar statutory sections differently, based on their
plain language); Elmer v. Burgin, 2 N.J.L. 173, 179–80 (1807) (plain language shows intent of
legislature).
185. E.g., Hadley v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 864 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ill. 2007).
186. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020) (with emphasis added and internal lettering
omitted).
187. The author has consulted a number of linguists and adjacent professionals in reaching this
conclusion. It can be reasonably argued that the construction is a variant of the past perfect or
pluperfect; these two tenses are closely related, and in nonacademic settings are often collapsed.
Compare § 5.133: Past-Perfect Tense, THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ONLINE (2017), available
at https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/book/ed17/part2/ch05/psec133.html (defining one as the
other), with Raphael Salkie, Perfect and Pluperfect: What Is the Relationship?, 25 J. LINGUISTICS
1, 3–13 (1989) (conducting a literature review of differences between the two). Regardless of the
specific definition, all consulted agree that the core of the verbal phrase is a perfect construction,
which necessarily occurs entirely in the past.
188. § 5.132 Present-Perfect Tense, THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ONLINE (2017),
https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/book/ed17/part2/ch05/psec132.html.
189. This degree of statutory analysis is rare, but not unknown, in the caselaw. See Hayashi v.
Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 17 (describing the effect of a phrase in
present perfect tense). There are certainly cases where a single statutory command could be phrased
multiple ways, where the specific wording chosen is of little consequence. E.g., Paramount
Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1950) (minor difference between imperfect
and pluperfect subjunctives “is no more than one of tense and grammar”). Here, however, only a
perfect tense construction can convey the intent that a prior event occurred wholly in the past—and
if the legislature had that intent, it could only convey it with such a construction. The present
perfect, with the caveat noted in footnote 187, supra, is the only available construction. The statute
is complex, but unambiguous.
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ii. Publication Requires Three Full Weeks
The specific requirements of service by publication have varied over
the years, depending on statutory requirements and custom of the day.190
The Code of Civil Procedure currently provides that publication is to run
“at least once in each week for 3 successive weeks.”191 No Illinois court
has addressed when service by publication is complete, in those terms.
But that is not to say the issue has not been addressed; it simply does not
merit inclusion in a written disposition because it is too self-evident.192
At the risk of tautologizing, the statutory procedure is completed when
all statutory requirements are satisfied.193 The statute means exactly what
it says: service by publication requires a full three weeks of
publication.194
The same conclusion can be reached the other way around, by looking
to when publication is not complete. All three publications must occur
for service by publication to be jurisdictionally effective.195 If fewer than
the required number of publications occur, the publication process is
incomplete and therefore ineffective.196 If publication ran only two
190. E.g., REV. STAT. 1858, at 139, Chancery, § 8 (four weeks’ publication by default);
Hollenbeck v. Detrick, 44 N.E. 732, 734 (Ill. 1896) (six weeks’ publication to dissolve corporation);
Taylor v. Taylor, 52 Ill. App. 527, 528 (4th Dist. 1893) (seven weeks’ publication for divorce);
Hernandez v. Drake, 81 Ill. 34, 37 (1875) (eight or nine weeks’ publication is “amply sufficient”);
Aldis v. South Park Comm’rs, 49 N.E. 565, 567 (Ill. 1898) (five consecutive days’ publication for
park district taking). Despite the varied uses of publication, it has historically most often been
important in cases concerning real estate. See F. Barth, Comment, Chancery Practice, 8 ILL. L.
REV. 203, 206 (1913–14) (reviewing the purposes of publication).
191. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-207 (2020).
192. If publication is even mentioned, it is usually only to say that it occurred, without more.
E.g., In re L.H.S., 2015 IL App (3d) 140844-U, ¶ 31 (holding that publication “had been
completed”). Even a case that turns on a challenge to service by publication might only mention
the dates of publication, without bothering to specify that those dates discharged the publication
requirement. E.g., U.S. Bank Tr., v. Colston, 2015 IL App (5th) 140100, ¶ 18.
193. See Green Tree Servicing v. Stuckey, 2016 IL App (3d) 150233-U, ¶ 21 (noting that “act
of publication” for jurisdictional purposes was the publication of notices for three successive weeks,
in compliance with statute). This proposition is hardly novel. Accord CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Lewis,
2014 IL App (1st) 131272, ¶ 39 (explaining for service of motions, rather than service of process,
“[s]ervice is complete when all the required acts are done”).
194. The statute also requires that a copy of the notice actually published be mailed to the last
known address of the party against whom publication is sought. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a5) (2020). This requirement is separate and apart from the publication itself, though both are
required. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Horton, 376 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1978).
Because the notice must be mailed within ten days of the first publication, it is irrelevant for
determining when publication is complete, for either notice was sent by the time the third
publication occurs (and the issue is therefore moot), or it was not (in which case the publication is
defective on other grounds).
195. Stuckey, 2016 IL App (3d) 150233-U, ¶ 21; Aurora Loan Servs. v. Black, 2012 IL App
(1st) 111698-U, ¶ 24.
196. No cases stand for this proposition in Illinois caselaw. The closest the reported cases come
is an 1899 First District case, which favorably recites an earlier New York decision. In the New
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weeks, would any party to a foreclosure consider it legally effective?
Certainly not.197
Because publication must run for three full weeks, it is not complete
until the third publication occurs. Service is complete at the third
publication, and only then can the redemption period under section 1603
start to run.
2. Section 1603’s Other Service Provisions
Because the plain language of section 1603 admits of only one
interpretation, that language is dispositive of the inquiry.198 To the extent
ambiguity exists, the remaining service provisions bear discussion. This
is because statutes should be evaluated as a whole, comparing phrases
and provisions against one another where appropriate.199
Every other redemption calculation in section 1603 runs from the date
service is unambiguously completed: either a singular service event;
submission to jurisdiction; entry of a judgment of foreclosure; or, in
certain cases with severely undervalued property, at the expiry of
statutory reinstatement.200 These are admittedly not useful direct
comparisons, because all other service events contemplated occur at a
point in time. But the comparison has value not for what the other
provisions contain, but what they do not.
If the General Assembly wished a statutory period to run against the
mortgagor from a point in time prior to the completion of service, it could
have said so. We know this to be true because it has said so in another
context: section 1505.6.201 That section specifically provides that if a
York case, publication was required to run for six weeks; after four, the plaintiff died. The court
held that, because there was no longer a plaintiff for the last two weeks’ publication, they were not
legally effective, and so with only four of the six weeks published, jurisdiction was not obtained.
King v. Mitchell, 83 Ill. App. 632, 641 (1st Dist. 1899) (quoting Reilly v. Hart, 29 N.E. 1099, 1100
(N.Y. 1892)). The Illinois court did not rely on that particular conclusion—it was concerned with
the effect of the death of a party on the abatement of a cause of action—but it clearly considered
the analysis favorably.
197. Again, no cases stand for this proposition with respect to service by publication. The
closest decision is an 1878 case where a special master was required to publish a sale for three
weeks; he published for two, and the sale was therefore in error. Augustine v. Doud, 1 Ill. App.
588, 592–93 (2d Dist. 1878). In the author’s own experience, this sort of flaw would never reach
the appellate courts: no trial judge would enter judgment over such a glaring jurisdictional defect,
and if such judgment were entered, none would hesitate to vacate it. In other words, even if such
an obvious error occurred, it is exceedingly unlikely that it would ever survive for appellate review
and reporting.
198. See, e.g., Hadley v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 864 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ill. 2007) (holding that where
plain language is unambiguous, it is dispositive).
199. E.g., People v. Glisson, 782 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Ill. 2002).
200. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020) (service other than by publication). See also
id. § 2-213(d) (submission to jurisdiction); id. § 15-1603(b)(3) (calculation based on reinstatement
in certain cases).
201. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1505.6(a) (2020).
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foreclosure defendant participates in a hearing, they have sixty days from
that hearing within which to challenge personal jurisdiction, or else the
objection is waived.202 It mirrors—but actually predates—the similar
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure generally regarding waivers of
personal jurisdiction.203
Section 1505.6 is designed to prevent abuses of challenges to personal
jurisdiction by preventing a borrower from participating in a case,
receiving some benefit therein, and then launching frivolous
jurisdictional motion practice once the case turns against them.204 Its
relevance here is simpler even than that: it provides for a statutory period
to run against the mortgagor based solely on their participation in a case
prior to service occurring.205 Given this, if the General Assembly wished
redemption to run before service was complete, it could have said so,
adding a third prong to section 1603.206
3. Default Judgments by Publication
A judgment by default may be sought thirty days after service.207
When service is by publication, however, the Code of Civil Procedure
specifies that the thirty-day period runs from the first of the three
publications.208 The interaction with redemption is self-evident: if the
default period runs from the first publication, why shouldn’t the
redemption period track?
At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be noted that the statutory
exception for default publications is exactly that: an exception that
governs how the time period for default operates. By its terms, it cannot
directly govern the redemption calculation. Closer examination of the
202. Id.
203. Cf. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-301(a-6) (2020). The IMFL’s provision was enacted in 2011,
P.A. 97-0329, 2011 Ill. Laws 8198 (eff. Aug. 12, 2011), and the Code in 2018, P.A. 100-291 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2018).
204. See U.S. Bank Tr. v. Colston, 2015 IL App (5th) 140100, ¶¶ 22–23.
205. It is unlikely that a mortgagor would participate in a case without having been served, for
service attempts are early and routine. But section 1505.6 by its terms waives any challenge to
personal jurisdiction based on participation in a hearing, just as waiver would occur with the filing
of a non-jurisdictional responsive pleading. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1505.6(b) (2020); id. § 2301(a).
206. It might be observed that section 1505.6 dates to 2011, nearly a quarter century after
adoption of the IMFL at large in 1987. Ultimately, the chronology is irrelevant, for the question is
what the General Assembly could have done when enacting section 1603.
207. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1301(d) (2020) (providing that default judgment can be entered
for failure to appear or plead); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 101(d) (providing that summons requires an
appearance within thirty days of service); Id. R. 181(a) (requiring an appearance within thirty days
of service). This general provision may be altered by local rule. Cook County, for instance, requires
a sixty-day period for residential foreclosures. General Administrative Order 2012-10 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co. Oct. 17, 2012) (creating the sixty-day rule).
208. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-207 (2020).
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default provision’s history and operation, however, demonstrate that it is
not a good comparator for the redemption statute, as their underlying
purposes and motivations are radically divergent.
First and foremost, the default statute’s exception is exactly that: an
exception. If service by publication were complete after the first
publication, there would be no need to specify that the default time period
ran from the first publication—indeed, there would be no need for the
second two publications at all. The fact that the publication statute
requires an exception demonstrates that, absent that express provision, a
contrary result would issue.209
Second, however, the history of the publication statute sheds light on
both its meaning and application. The statutory exception may seem
incongruous to a modern read, but makes perfect historical sense. Service
by publication dates to 1827.210 At that time, courts were not in
continuous session, but sat in discrete spring and fall terms, a practice that
continues today in both state and federal supreme courts. Publication was
coupled to terms: if you could not serve the complaint by term time, you
then published, and the court could enter judgment.211 This process was
inefficient. At the time, terms of court could easily be measured in days,
so publishing would inevitably delay judgment until the next court
term—six months or one year later.212
In recognition of this problem, the greatly expanded provisions of the
Chancery Act of 1845 reframed publication: instead of coming to court,
publishing, and then coming back to court, the revised publication statute
permitted a party to publish first, setting a return date during the term of
court, so as to require only one appearance.213 Publication was thus fixed
at four weeks’ publication and sixty days before default could be taken.214

209. That is not to tritely say that the exception proves the rule; it could simply resolve a latent
ambiguity. But in order for the exception to have meaning, it must have legal effect. People v.
Glisson, 782 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Ill. 2002) (noting that all portions of the statute should carry
meaning). At the least, the existence of the exception disproves a contrary rule.
210. Chancery Act of June 1, 1827, § 5.
211. Id.
212. Early in the 1800s, terms of court were often measured in days, with single-digit caseloads.
By midcentury a more robust caseload had developed, which measured terms in weeks. Either
figure is refreshingly quaint to the modern eye. Terry Wilson, The Business of a Midwestern Trial
Court: Knox County, Illinois, 1841-1850, 84 ILL. HIST. J. 249, 251 (1991). For a fascinating history
of the territorial and early state court system, see generally George A. Dupuy, The Earliest Courts
of the Illinois Country, 1 ILL. L.R. 81 (1906–07).
213. Chancery Act of March 3, 1845, § 8. This quirk of publication remains to this day: for in
rem or quasi in rem cases, a plaintiff may simply publish as to defendants, without seeking court
approval first. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206 (2020); cf. id. § 2-203.1. Though not strictly
necessary, it is always preferable to comprehensively document and exhaust other service
mechanisms, if only to strengthen the case for publication, should it be later challenged.
214. Chancery Act of June 1, 1827, § 5.
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The purpose of the statutory exception in this situation is clear: if a
plaintiff needed to file a case, publish for four weeks, and then wait an
additional sixty days before moving for judgment, the publication process
might still outpace the term of court, and the statutory streamlining would
serve no purpose. By allowing publication and the default period to both
run in substantial part prior to the term of court, cases could be timely
decided so long as the judgment was entered on or after the return date.215
Two hundred years of statutory development have led to a modern
default procedure that, while still based on that 1845 framework, is
substantially slimmer than the original: publication runs three weeks,
with a thirty-day default period. Courts have responded by giving
defendants extensions on those time periods for good cause shown, which
often requires nothing more than the ask—indeed, seeking additional
time to answer is often considered a routine motion.216 Furthermore, if a
default should be entered, it can be vacated within thirty days almost as a
matter of right.217
It is therefore evident that the default period and the redemption period
serve two very different purposes. The default period marks out a time
after which an adverse event—judgment—may occur if a subsequent
motion is filed and presented. And, even then, the default period is often
extended or waived as a matter of course; even if default is entered, it can
be easily undone. Permitting the default to run from the first publication
makes practical sense: if the defendant does not participate, then the
plaintiff can seek their judgment and resolve the case sooner rather than
later.218 But the moment a defendant seeks to participate, they have ample
215. E.g., Pile v. McBratney, 15 Ill. 314, 317, 318 (1853) (noting that the publication ran from
March 8 through April 26, and the judgment was entered May 13).
216. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 183; accord 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1007 (2020). See, e.g., Venteurs,
LLC v. Johnson, 2017 IL App (1st) 151464-U, ¶ 16 (collecting cases for proposition that motions
are routine); Adcock v. Adcock, 91 N.E.2d 99, 101–02 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1950) (noting that a key
factor under Rule 183 is diligence exercised by party seeking additional time).
217. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1301(e) (2020). A defendant need not make out a defense on
the merits; the only question is whether vacating a default would work “substantial justice” between
the parties. People v. Ralph L. (In re Haley D.), 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 57. Usually, this is met simply
by asking to vacate the default; law and equity both disfavor defaults. Id. at ¶ 69. Note that because
the judgment of foreclosure is not a final order, a trial court usually will not lose primary jurisdiction
thirty days after its entry. Thus, motions to vacate a default judgment of foreclosure are technically
timely up to thirty days after confirmation of sale, though by that point a defendant faces other
hurdles as well. See generally Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469 (holding that a
1301 motion is timely until after confirmation of sale, but after sale occurs, such motions must also
seek to vacate the sale under 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1508(b) (2020). For an excellent overview
of the procedures and practice surrounding vacating default judgments in foreclosure cases, see
generally Horan, supra note 142.
218. This interest is most obvious in foreclosure cases. Over seventy percent of all foreclosure
cases are defaults, where no defendant appears or otherwise takes any action with respect to judicial
proceedings. See supra note 4 (statistical analysis). In the author’s chancery experience, only
insurance declaratory actions have a similarly high rate of nonparticipation.
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opportunity and provision, both through statute and caselaw, to remedy
any default and litigate on the merits.
Redemption, by contrast, is a homeowner’s last practical opportunity
to save their property, after which the right is automatically extinguished.
And, once expired, it can neither be extended nor revived.219 The
principle of flexibility underlying the default period is simply absent in
the redemption statute. Because the statutes have radically divergent
motivations and applications, it would be inappropriate to appeal to the
default publication exception as the basis of an analogy justifying
interpretation of a redemption calculation from the first date of
publication.
C. Redemption by Way of Reinstatement
Redemption and reinstatement are different statutes with different
histories, but their plain text is deeply intertwined. The redemption
statute’s language concerning the calculation of the statutory time period
is deliberately copied from the reinstatement statute, almost word for
word. The most salient difference is that the reinstatement statute has an
exception that redemption does not: for reinstatement, and reinstatement
only, the calculation explicitly runs from the first publication.
The existence of the exception in the reinstatement statute
demonstrates how the general rule underlying the calculation language
must be to calculate the time period from the third publication—for if it
were otherwise, the exception would mean nothing. Virtually every
applicable principle of statutory construction supports transferring this
reasoning to the redemption statute, concluding that, absent an exception
to the contrary, redemption should run from the third publication. The
redemption statute has no exception, and none should be implied.
1. Different Statutes, Common Calculation
Statutory redemption dates to 1825, predating the 1961 statutory
reinstatement provisions by nearly a century and a half.220 Yet
reinstatement is a particularly valuable lens through which to understand
redemption. This is because the IMFL, which reworked the entire
statutory scheme governing foreclosures, affected each section
differently.
By 1987, redemption was well into its second century, and had
undergone substantial changes and additions during that period, leading
219. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(c)(1) (2020).
220. An Act concerning Judgments and Executions, §§ 11, 12 (eff. May 1, 1825) (redemption);
Act Relating to Mortgages of Real Property, Nov. 14, 1961, § 7 (eff. July 1, 1962), codified as ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (1963) (reinstatement). See also supra accompanying text notes 51, 95
(history of reinstatement and redemption statutes, respectively).
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to a proliferation of substantially similar redemption statutes, each
governing a slightly different situation.221 All versions, however, allowed
for post-sale redemption, one of the main procedures the IMFL was
intended to change.222 As part of the IMFL, the redemption statute had to
be reworked to incorporate a mechanism to start the redemption clock
from the date of service, which, at the time, the statute did not contain.223
Alongside this statutory change, the IMFL collected all the various
foreclosure-related statutory provisions to a single location, where they
had previously been scattered throughout the Code of Civil Procedure.224
As part of this, reinstatement was corralled into the IMFL as section
1602—but because the new statutory scheme did not implicate
reinstatement, the language of the statute remained unchanged in
substance, save for minor consistency changes to unify the foreclosure
lexicon.225
Crucially, then as now, the reinstatement statute explicitly calculates
the reinstatement period from the date of service. So when the redemption
statute was integrated into the IMFL as section 1603, and the new statute
needed a way to calculate the redemption period from the date of service,
it simply copied the reinstatement statute’s method of calculation, which
at that point had been refined over the better part of twenty-five years.
Consider, therefore, the relevant portions of the reinstatement statute,
which set forth when reinstatement is to be made:
[P]rior to the expiration of 90 days from the date the mortgagor or, if
more than one, all the mortgagors (i) have been served with summons
or by publication or (ii) have otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court.226

And compare the relevant portions of the redemption statute, setting
out the redemption time period:
[O]n the later of (i) the date 7 months from the date the mortgagor or, if
more than one, all the mortgagors (A) have been served with summons
or by publication or (B) have otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of

221. See supra Section I.C.2.i (historical developments of statutory redemption).
222. See supra Section II.C.2.ii (principal motivations of IMFL); see generally Gnatek, supra
note 11 (discussing same).
223. The statute had contained such an exception, but the provision that had contained it was
eliminated as redundant four years prior. The circumstances of that elimination were messy, to say
the least. See infra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
224. For instance, the redemption statute itself did not become part of the Code of Civil
Procedure until as late as 1981. P.A. 82-280 (eff. July 1, 1982); see also supra text accompanying
note 104 (statutory shuffling of redemption statute).
225. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (reviewing complete legislative history).
226. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-1602 (1987); cf. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020).
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the court, or (ii) the date 3 months from the date of entry of a judgment
of foreclosure.227

Even though the redemption statute is far older, its language is quite
clearly modeled on the reinstatement statute. This establishes an almost
perfect test case for the venerable doctrine of statutory construction
known as in pari materia: it should be presumed that two sections of the
same statute are governed by the same motivations and should be
construed together and consistently.228
Untangling the redemption statute’s calculation by reference to
reinstatement is made substantially easier by the fact that reinstatement
has what redemption does not: an exception.
2. The “First Publication” Exception
Immediately following the above-quoted reinstatement calculation, the
reinstatement statute provides a black-and-white exception: “When
service is made by publication, the first date of publication shall be used
for the calculation.”229 Currently, the reinstatement statute has this
exception, and the redemption statute does not—but it was not always so.
The “first publication” exception has come and gone in both statutes over
the past half-century, and a close examination of the chronology is
necessary to understand why.230
As originally enacted, the 1825 redemption statute permitted
redemption for up to fifteen months following a sale.231 Subsequent
legislation whittled that period down bit by bit, both by directly reducing
the general redemption period and by adding statutory exceptions for
certain types of cases, parties, or both.232 One of these changes came in
1961, with the addition of an optional hard cap on the redemption
timeline designed to rein in the sprawling redemption timetable.233 The
general redemption period was still twelve months from sale, but the
227. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 15-1603(b)(1) (1987); cf. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/151603(b)(1) (2020).
228. E.g., Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114925, ¶ 39; Nance v. Howard, 1 Ill. 242, 245 (1828);
accord, e.g., Respublica v. Nicholson, 2 Yeates 9, at **3 (Pa. 1795).
229. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020).
230. Usually, the legislative history is the best source of insight as to what motivated these
repeated and facially contradictory changes. Here, that history is unavailable; information about
even the most recent changes in 1987 is hard to find at best, to say nothing of sixties-era legislation.
The best way to unravel this statutory ping-pong is to closely scrutinize the statutory configurations
of the era to determine what practical problems motivated the changes. See Hillman v. Hillman,
910 A.2d 262, 274 (Del. Ch. 2006) (containing a similar analysis on repeatedly and contradictorily
revised statute).
231. Twelve for the mortgagor, and three thereafter for creditors. An Act Concerning Judgments
and Executions, §§ 11, 12 (eff. May 1, 1825).
232. See generally supra Section I.C.2.ii (history of statutory redemption in Illinois).
233. Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 347.
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judgment of foreclosure could now identify the date of service upon the
mortgagors; if it did so, the redemption period instead expired on the later
of twelve months from service or six months from sale.234 As part of that
calculation, if service was by publication, the period was to be calculated
from the first publication.235
The reinstatement statute also dates to 1961, but from a different law
passed nine months later.236 It simply calculated ninety days “from the
date of service of summons,” and contained no provision accounting for
cases of service by publication.237 The reinstatement statute’s calculation
language today is substantially unchanged from the original 1961
language.238
Redemption changed again in 1982, shrinking again to six months
from sale, unless cut short by a calculation of six months from service or
six months from the judgment.239 It again contained a “first publication”
exception in the optional hard cap.240 As with the 1961 version, though,
because the redemption timeline operated independently of the sale and
judgment process, it is unclear what, if any, effect these calculations had
on the foreclosure process as a whole.
At around the same time, however, the redemption provisions were
shifted into the Code of Civil Procedure, with its adoption in 1983.241 As
part of those revisions, the optional hard cap, with its “first publication”
exception, was dropped entirely.242 This makes sense: the hard cap
originated when redemption was twelve months from sale, but now that
it was only six months, the cap was redundant, and eliminating it helped
simplify the dizzying web of redemptions.243
234. Act of August 7, 1961, L. 1961, p. 2852. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18 (1961)
(discussing the general redemption period); id. § 18e (discussing exception).
235. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1961).
236. Act Relating to Mortgages of Real Property, Nov. 14, 1961, § 7 (eff. July 1, 1962).
237. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (1961).
238. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (1961), with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602
(2020).
239. P.A. 82-783, 1982 Ill. Laws 384 (eff. July 13, 1982).
240. Id. Note that, because the Illinois Revised Statutes were issued on odd-numbered years,
and this version was effective 1982 and lasted barely one month, it was never formally published
in a regular issue of the statute books. See infra note 243 and accompanying text (identifying
convoluted procedural history).
241. P.A. 82-280, 1981 Ill. Laws 1524 (eff. July 1, 1982).
242. P.A. 82-937, 1982 Ill. Laws 3249 (eff. Aug. 18, 1982).
243. The chain of events here is somehow even more complex than as described here. Going
into 1980, the general redemption provision was a twelve-month window, with a six-month hard
cap, tied to the “first publication” language. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1979). In August 1981,
the Code of Civil Procedure moved the redemption provision from the Judgments Act to the newly
created Code, without changes. P.A. 82-280, 1981 Ill. Laws 1524 (eff. July 1, 1982). The general
redemption provision was then reduced to six months—but because the Code had not yet taken
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The complexity of this conditional redemption calculation alone
should make the impetus for an amended, unified mortgage foreclosure
law painfully clear.244 Among many other things, the IMFL combined
reinstatement and redemption under a single Act, changing the language
of both in the process. So when the IMFL’s drafters decided to put a
publication calculation back into the redemption statute, instead of
reaching back to the redemption statute’s own prior calculation—which
was wrapped up in a complex web of statutory repealers that no one
wanted to reopen—the drafters simply copied the reinstatement statute’s
publication calculation, which had no “first publication” exception. As
initially enacted in the IMFL, both the reinstatement and redemption
statutes calculated time periods based on service by publication, but
neither contained the “first publication” exception.245
Shortly after the IMFL’s implementation, the General Assembly
passed two “clean-up” Acts, which implemented a scattershot of changes
to the statute.246 Some of the changes added necessary clarification, some
were simple copyedits, and some fixed things that had slipped through
the cracks.247 For reasons unknown, the old redemption statute’s “first
publication” exception was revived in the reinstatement statute—and
only in the reinstatement statute—in 1990.248 Redemption, then as now,
contains no such exception.

effect at the time the reduction act was drafted, it actually accomplished the reduction by amending
the Judgments Act, not the Code. P.A. 82-783, 1982 Ill. Laws 384 (eff. July 13, 1982). The hard
cap, and “first publication” language, was now redundant, and repealed not even a month
thereafter—but again, this repealer targeted the Judgments Act, not the Code. P.A. 82-937, 1982
Ill. Laws 3249 (eff. Aug. 18, 1982). Thus, by the end of 1982, the Code had a twelve-month window
with six-month hard cap, but the Judgments Act, which the Code was supposed to have repealed,
was freshly amended with a six-month window and no hard cap. The General Assembly solved the
problem in 1983 with a second repealer, which incorporated all of the 1982 changes into the Code
and repealed the Judgments Act once and for all. P.A. 82-1057, 1982 Ill. Laws 3249 (eff. Feb. 11,
1983).
244. See generally, e.g., Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57 (painstakingly describing old
mode of procedure and proposing substantial reforms, some of which survived into the IMFL).
245. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 15-1602, 15-1603(b)(i) (1987).
246. P.A. 85-907, 1987 Ill. Laws 3802 (eff. Nov. 23, 1987); P.A. 86-974, 1989 Ill. Laws 6578
(eff. July 1, 1990).
247. See generally supra note 246. None of this is particularly surprising, given that the IMFL
was a complete overhaul of foreclosure law. If anything else, it’s remarkable how few changes had
to be made once the statute went into effect and various stakeholders could see how it worked in
practice. Nevertheless, the IMFL was a major statutory overhaul with major consequences. Some
were apparent at the time, and addressed via the clean-up bills. Some came out only with years of
experience. E.g., Stanley P. Sklar & James P. Moran, Does the Mortgage Foreclosure Law’s Notice
Provision End the Relation-Back Doctrine?, 82 ILL. B.J. 324 (1994). Some lingering issues are still
outstanding—such as the proper calculation of redemption when service occurs by publication.
248. P.A. 86-974, 1989 Ill. Laws 6595 (eff. July 1, 1990). For more on why this circumstance
may have come to pass, the author speculates in Section II.D infra.
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3. A Meaningful Exception Requires a Rule
It is a core principle of statutory construction that every part of a statute
should have meaning.249 Both the law and common sense disfavor
interpretations that nullify words or phrases; if something is in a statute,
it is there for a reason, and should mean something. This principle is
intuitive as applied to statutory exceptions: the general rule cannot be the
same as the exception, for if it were, the exception would mean
nothing.250
Here, the reinstatement’s statute exception provides that the
reinstatement period is to be calculated from the first of the three
publications. The existence of this exception necessarily requires a
contrary general rule: but for the exception, reinstatement would not be
calculated from the first date of publication. And here, the general rule is
self-evident from the nature of service by publication. Because service by
publication is only complete after the third publication,251 any statutory
time period running from the date of publication would only run from the
third publication.
Having established the general rule with respect to reinstatement, the
same principle can be applied to the redemption statute’s calculation. The
language of the redemption statute is identical, mutatis mutandis, to that
of the reinstatement statute. This implicates the general principle that the
use of identical language in similar contexts should be construed
similarly.252 And, general principles aside, here we know that the
redemption language was deliberately copied from the reinstatement
statute.253
The redemption statute’s calculation language must therefore operate
on the same general rule as the reinstatement statute: redemption is to be
calculated from the third publication. Reinstatement has an exception,
and redemption does not. That omission is presumptively intentional, a
249. E.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1083–84 (Ill. 1997).
250. This particular combination of statutory construction over a statutory exception is less
common in the caselaw, but it is certainly established. One good, if convoluted, example is a 2011
tax appeal case concerning whether land was properly defined as “open use” land. Onwentsia Club
v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 2011 IL App (2d) 100388, ¶ 6. The general rule did not specify whether
property improved with a building could still be considered “open use.” Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. But one
statutory exception provided that land primarily used for residential purposes was not “open use.”
Id. at ¶ 11. The exception necessarily entailed that land not primarily used for residential purposes
was “open use.” And residence necessarily entailed a building to reside in. Thus, the general rule
necessarily required that land with a building but not primarily used for residential purposes could
still be considered “open use.” Id.; see also Shared Imaging, LLC v. Hamer, 2017 IL App (1st)
152817, ¶ 39 (featuring a similar type of analysis).
251. See supra Section II.B.1.ii (explaining publication requires three full weeks).
252. In re Estate of Wilson, 939 N.E.2d 426, 452–53 (Ill. 2010).
253. See supra Section II.C.1 (comparing the language in the reinstatement and redemption
statutes).
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presumption made all the stronger by the fact that the legislature passed
the IMFL without any exceptions, and then chose to add the exception
back in—but only to reinstatement.254 To read a “first publication”
exception into the redemption statute requires either interpreting the
general rules of the parallel statutes differently or injecting an exception
where none exists.255 Neither is permissible.
The inescapable conclusion is that the statutory redemption period
must be calculated from the third date of publication. To hold otherwise
would contradict the plain language of the redemption and publication
statutes, be fundamentally at odds with the purposes of the statutes,
impale the reinstatement statute on the horns of a dilemma, and generally
violate a half-dozen iron-clad rules of statutory construction.
D. How the Elephant Got its Trunk
It would be useful to identify why the current redemption statute lacks
the “first publication” language present in the reinstatement statute.
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer. Examining other relevant
legislative changes suggests that the omission was intentional, but little
else.
The original purpose of the redemption period lies in the State’s
agrarian roots. If a farmer had a bad crop and fell behind on the mortgage,
a twelve-month redemption window gave them another season to raise a
good crop and redeem.256 Likewise, the early American economy
experienced frequent real estate fluctuations; in twelve months, property
value might well increase enough to make redemption viable.257
Neither of these original motivations makes sense for modern
redemption, where the residential property does not generate income and
is unlikely to significantly appreciate in value. Not even an excellent crop
would yield anywhere close to the principal balance on a standard multidecade mortgage—and, in any event, farmland is explicitly excluded

254. See supra Section II.C.2 (chronicling the history of reinstatement statute’s exception); P.A.
86-974, 1989 Ill. Laws 6595 (eff. July 1, 1990) (re-injecting exception to reinstatement statute).
See also People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. 2006) (explaining legislative omissions
presumptively intentional, and lead to different results).
255. Trivially, courts cannot read into statutes exceptions that are not there. E.g., People v.
Glisson, 782 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Ill. 2002); Collins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 83 N.E. 542, 543 (Ill.
1907).
256. Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 335 (citing ROBERT KRATOVIL, MODERN
MORTGAGE LAW & PRACTICE 333 (1972)); accord Ghent, supra note 102, at 1106–08 (surveying
early redemption periods and noting that, of states that offered redemption, many ran twelve or
twenty-four months).
257. Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 335 (quoting Strause v. Dutch, 95 N.E. 286, 287–
88 (Ill. 1911)) (“It is a matter of common knowledge that real estate values, either from general or
local causes, make sudden and material advances.”).
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from the definition of residential property.258 And though the modern
economy has its swings, it is exceedingly unlikely that market
appreciation alone would make a dent in the debt.259
Legislators were reluctant to limit redemption in explicit terms,
because doing so appears to disfavor mortgagors.260 The redemption
statute therefore sprouted more and more provisions.261 The most
substantial, added in 1961, introduced the “first publication” language for
the first time, and bears investigation.262 That provision was originally
designed as a backstop to ensure that, if a lender used its mechanisms,
redemption would expire sooner, rather than later.263 Thus, the “first
publication” exception simply makes that period expire two weeks
sooner. But because that provision did not always apply, and even when
it did it would not have driven the sale timeline, it was likely more
palatable than simply cutting down the redemption period in toto.
The IMFL nestled reinstatement and redemption side by side as
sections 1602 and 1603, respectively, rewriting the language of both as
needed.264 As originally implemented, neither section contained the “first
publication” language. The legislative history, usually the best resource
for why the General Assembly took a certain action, contains no hint of
why.265
But the motivation is perhaps self-evident: when rewriting a statute,
why create more exceptions than necessary?266 If the intent was for
258. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1219 (2020).
259. If the property was worth more than the debt to start with, the borrower could always sell
it, pay off the loan, and walk away with the excess; no redemption is necessary to do that. Because
the property is residential, borrowers are not faced with the question of selling an asset, but rather
selling their home, which imposes noneconomic but very real burdens. But see THE BEVERLY
HILLBILLIES, CBS (1962–71) (chronicling the escapades of a nouveau riche family who stumble
upon immense wealth following an oil survey of their backwoods swampland estate).
260. Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 381 n.324 (“Redemption laws are like cherry pie.
They serve no useful purpose, but politicians are reluctant to change them, because such action
appears to disfavor mortgagors.”).
261. See generally id. at 342–51 (describing the mechanics of pre-IMFL redemption).
262. H.R. 297, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1961); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1961).
263. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1961); see also Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 347
(noting the purpose of section 18e).
264. P.A. 84-1462, 1986 Ill. Laws 4392 (eff. July 1, 1987); see ILL. REV. STAT ch. 110, §§ 1602,
1603 (1987).
265. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. Johnson, 477 N.E.2d 482, 484 (Ill. 1985) (exploring the
legislative history of statute instructive in determining intent); Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 769
N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2002) (explaining the usefulness of legislative transcripts and
floor remarks).
266. The author has scoured the General Assembly’s archives for floor debates on the bills that
became the IMFL. Debates on the matter appear few and far between, suggesting the majority of
horse-trading happened, as might be expected, in committee or otherwise behind closed doors.
Redemption is mentioned by reference, rather than as a topic itself. See, e.g., H.R., 84th Gen.
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redemption to run shorter for publication, the statute could have just said
so—or even set a six-month period for publication, just like it sets a sixmonth period for nonresidential foreclosures.267
The most interesting question here, though, is why the “first
publication” exception was later added back in, but only for
reinstatement.268 The 1989 bill that added the exception in was one of
two clean-up bills that passed in the wake of the IMFL. And on that bill’s
third reading on the House floor, the House debate, in its entirety,
consisted of the following statement from its sponsor, Peg Breslin:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Ladies and Gentlemen this Bill now cleans up
the former Mortgage Foreclosure Act that we passed a couple of years
ago. Makes it more workable makes only one change in the issue of
publication and that is that you don’t have to republish if you have
adjourned your sale. And the adjourned sale happens within 60 days of
the original notice. If you adjourn more than 60 days you still have to
republish. So that the only thing that it changes within the notice
requirements. There is no change whatsoever with regard the
redemption period. Which was the one of the controversial parts of the
Bill, that has been strip from the Bill completely. I ask that it be passed.
Thank you.269

The sixty-day discussion refers to requirements for the publication of
sale, which is unrelated to service by publication.270 The interesting part
is the second half, an almost throwaway remark that there is no change to
the reinstatement period, and that such a proposed change was
controversial and stripped completely. This tantalizing hint stands alone;
no other House discussion touches it, and the bill had no substantive
Senate discussion at all.271
But from that one side comment, it is possible to make an educated
guess as to what happened. In the course of negotiating the clean-up bill,
lenders likely tried to re-inject the “first publication” exception. This
would have been reasonable, as the exception used to be present under
the prior redemption statute, though it served a different purpose. It would
likewise have been reasonable to introduce it as to both redemption and
reinstatement, since both used the same language of calculation. Faced
Assemb., at 290 (Ill. 1986) (statement of Rep. Greiman) (pointing out that proposed thirty-five-day
delay in filing a suit is peanuts in comparison to the lengthy redemption period).
267. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(2) (2020).
268. P.A. 86-974, 1989 Ill. Laws 6595 (eff. July 1, 1990).
269. H.R., 86th Gen. Assemb., at 19–20 (Ill. 1989) (statement of Rep. Breslin) (errors as in
original transcript). The bill then passed virtually unanimously, with a vote tally of 102-0-1. Id.
270. The amendment of P.A. 86-974 remains in effect today, unchanged. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/15-1507(c)(4) (2020).
271. Note that other concurrent bills addressed shortening redemption from tax sales, a
procedure not governed by the IMFL. See, e.g., S., 86th Gen. Assemb., at. 7–8 (Ill. 1990) (statement
of Senator Netsch) (discussing redemption periods for tax sales).
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with the prospect of almost immediately “losing” two weeks off the
redemption period, homeowner interest groups would have objected to
the change—hence Representative Breslin calling it “controversial.” In
the end, the lenders backed down: the objectionable portions were
stripped, and the bill went on to become law.
Except, of course, that the exception remained as to reinstatement.
There are two principal explanations for what actually happened.
First, it is possible that the language was deliberately retained.
Reinstatement does not drive the foreclosure timeline, so losing two
weeks of reinstatement would be less of a loss than redemption.
Homeowner interest groups may have viewed the loss to reinstatement as
an acceptable payment to receive other favorable amendments. If this
were the case, and omission of the “first publication” language from
redemption were intentional, reading it back in would be plainly
inappropriate—but we may never know.
Second, it is possible that the reinstatement exception was an error. If
the focus was on reverting changes to the redemption statute, the new
language of the reinstatement statute may have slipped through the
cracks.272
Though we may never know what actually happened at the drafting
table, the second explanation—simple mistake—appears more likely. If
the exception was indeed “controversial,” why would the sponsor
characterize it as being stripped entirely when that was not the case? And
if retaining the exception for reinstatement was a horse trade, it was a
poor one indeed, for the rest of the bill’s changes to the IMFL are
uniformly beneficial to lenders, not borrowers.273
Ultimately, the lack of a clear statutory history means that the “first
publication” exception, and indeed the redemption statute itself, can only
be evaluated in its statutory context. And that context makes clear that,
because redemption lacks an exception, the redemption date must run
from the third publication.
III. MOVING FORWARD
Miscalculated redemption is a relatively rare problem, but it is a
persistent one. Foreclosure is a volume business, and institutional
pressures that strongly favor standardized and procedural litigation may
explain why this issue persists. Furthermore, because this issue only

272. Indeed, from a purely editorial point of view, section 1602 is presented as a large block of
text, while section 1603 is neatly subdivided. It would be easier to overlook one sentence among
dozens, particularly if one was not reading particularly closely, or late into the evening towards the
end of a busy legislative term.
273. See generally P.A. 86-974, 1989 Ill. Laws 6595–98 (eff. July 1, 1990).
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arises in cases where borrowers do not participate in the judicial process,
the issue fundamentally evades any judicial review.
Fortunately, the problem is primarily one of awareness. Once aware of
the issue, plaintiff’s firms can choose to voluntarily comply. Individual
judges can address redemption on a case-by-case basis. Systemic judicial
resolution by way of a general order may be a more effective solution.
Ultimately, however, shortening redemption is fundamentally a policy
decision, and should be done intentionally or not at all—and not by
accident.
A. Pervasiveness of Issue in Plaintiff’s Bar
Redemption is calculated by plaintiff’s firms as part of their proposed
judgment orders. To the extent any redemption period is miscalculated, it
is because plaintiff’s firms calculated it a certain way. This is not to say
that plaintiffs do so maliciously. Rather, the history of the redemption
statute suggests compelling reasons for why it was once done a certain
way, and these processes have simply not been updated. Furthermore, the
same institutional forces that cause plaintiff’s firms to miscalculate
redemption suggest that internal change is unlikely.
Setting aside for a moment the origin, history, and nature of the
problem with the redemption calculation, it bears asking the simple
question of why it persists. Reading through the redemption statute as it
currently stands, without reference to the reinstatement calculation and
its “first publication” exception, there is no reason to calculate
redemption from the first publication. Indeed, if the plain language is
unambiguous as this Article suggests it to be, one might rightly wonder
why it was ever misinterpreted to start with.
The reason is simple: institutional inertia. The plaintiff’s side of the
foreclosure bar is dominated by a relatively small number of extremely
high-volume firms.274 Many of these firms have existed, in one form or
another, for decades. And they have extensive internal procedures for
managing foreclosure cases, from projected case timetables to robust
forms for nearly any filing that might be necessary. These are all perfectly
reasonable, particularly in such a technically complex area of law; a firm
that juggles thousands of foreclosure filings per year could hardly survive
without extensive and comprehensive procedures. But the end result is a
system where, once codified, any given procedure becomes ossified,
persisting for years—even decades.

274. In Cook County, three firms are responsible for more than half (circa 53 percent) of all
residential foreclosure filings. See supra note 4 (statistical analysis). Just ten firms are responsible
for well over ninety percent of all filings. Id.
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Prior to the IMFL, the redemption date was calculated on a “first
publication” basis.275 It is likely that, when the IMFL went into effect,
firms simply retained as many of their prior procedures as possible,
changing only what was necessary. The new statute provided for seven
months instead of six, but aside from that, the redemption calculation in
almost every other case—i.e. aside from publication—would remain the
same. “Almost every” might have elided to “every,” and firms simply
calculated redemption the same way as before—even though the statute
had changed. Indeed, this may have been the basis for the debate that led
to the 1990 amendment and cryptic floor comments.276
Whatever the origin, it is highly likely that, at some point in the years
following the IMFL, at least one plaintiff’s firm started (or perhaps
continued) calculating redemption from the first publication. Such a
procedure would remain unchanged today—for without anyone to push
back on it, why would change be necessary?277
Finally, other practitioners have surely noticed this error; a first-year
law student tasked with calculating redemption could read the statute and
identify what it does not contain.278 But plaintiff’s attorneys have a
simple and powerful incentive to adhere to existing methods of
calculation: the resulting sale comes two weeks earlier.279 Because
lenders benefit from a faster sale, zealous advocacy would support the
client’s interest, and thus a “first publication” calculation. This advocacy
has likely been helped in no small part by the fact that this issue is utterly
unaddressed, either through caselaw or otherwise. It is the author’s hope
that this Article sheds light on the issue, and is cause for correction of the
430 cases per year that exhibit this problem.

275. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1961). This version was the basis for all subsequent
redemption statutes until the IMFL in 1987. The “first publication” language was stripped a few
years before that, in 1983, with the creation of the Code of Civil Procedure. See P.A. 82-937, 1982
Ill. Laws 3249 (eff. Aug. 18, 1982).
276. See supra Section II.D (featuring comments by Representative Breslin that suggest there
was some debate over amending the redemption calculation).
277. See infra Section III.B (noting how the redemption calculation evades judicial review).
This conclusion is buttressed by the author’s examination of foreclosure cases; miscalculated
redemption periods appear to be evenly distributed among foreclosure firms. See supra note 4
(statistical analysis). This is consistent with the theory that plaintiff’s firms largely duplicate each
other’s procedures, either intentionally or through parallel evolution, thus permitting this issue to
persist.
278. Indeed, a first-year law student serving as a judicial extern under the author’s supervision
did spot this discrepancy. The productive conversation about statutory interpretation that followed
is responsible in part for this Article.
279. When the author asked point-blank why their firm calculated redemption from the first
publication, one attorney responded, only half in jest, with a blunt “[because] it’s shorter.”
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B. Redemption Evades Judicial Review
Almost as problematic as its prevalence is the fact that any issue
concerning the proper calculation of redemption is largely beyond the
scope of judicial review. The issue here is twofold. First, as a practical
matter, in the time it would take to challenge redemption, the period
would expire, and any challenge would be moot. Second, and structurally,
even if the issue were somehow addressed, the IMFL itself largely bars
courts from granting effectual relief.
1. Raising a Challenge Delays Redemption
The basis of the mootness issue is simple: redemption is calculated as
the longer of seven months from service, however calculated, or three
months from judgment.280 Usually, those timelines will be fairly similar,
diverging only by a month or two. While the seven-month period starts
running at the time of service, the three-month period can only run once
a judgment is entered, which in turn requires waiting out the thirty (or
sixty) day default period, filing judgment motions, and getting a judgment
entered. On top of this, because foreclosure dockets tend to be congested,
even routine continuances tend to run long, in the sixty- to ninety-day
range. Thus, even a simple delay—failure to timely tender courtesy
copies, for instance281—can add months before a judgment is entered. If
entry of the judgment is delayed, even a bit, redemption will likely be
calculated based on the judgment, and not the date of service.
On top of this there is the simple fact that, in order to challenge
anything, there must be a challenger. As soon as a borrower wishes to
challenge the redemption calculation, they will be granted additional
time—either to file a responsive pleading, to participate in a court-

280. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).
281. The importance of tendering courtesy copies in a timely fashion cannot be understated, and
in the author’s experience, is not fully appreciated by many practitioners. Unless a party tenders
copies of its motions in advance, the judge generally does not know about it, and certainly has not
reviewed it. It is irrational to expect a judge to review motions on the bench, particularly when
judgment motions can run to hundreds of pages of exhibits each. It is, however, a great way to lose
judicial favor and irritate chambers staff.
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sponsored mediation program,282 or simply because they asked for it.283
Indeed, even if a default judgment had been entered, such judgments are
routinely vacated upon a party’s appearance.284
The effect of this additional time is simple: as a practical matter, the
very fact of a borrower’s appearance will cause the case to be continued
such that the redemption period will be calculated from the date of
judgment, rather than service. Any challenge to the calculation of
redemption from publication will therefore be moot, simply by the fact
that the challenge itself was raised.285
2. The IMFL Offers Alternate Relief
It is exceedingly difficult to construct a situation where a “first
publication” calculation affects the borrower in a way other than simply
shortening the case, but it can be done.286 Consider: if a judgment is
entered, and redemption is calculated based on publication, there is a twoweek period between the ends of redemption, based on whether it is
calculated from the first or third publication. If the borrower attempts to
redeem during that period, the lender might reject it on the basis that the
redemption period, that it had calculated based on the first publication,
expired.287
282. The commentary to Supreme Court Rule 114 recognizes the value of mediation and
strongly encourages circuit courts to adopt such programs. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 114. Unfortunately,
the biggest of these, the Cook County mortgage foreclosure mediation program, was terminated at
the end of 2017 due to budget cuts, a victim of the infamous Cook County sweetened beverage tax
debacle. See General Administrative Order 2018-01 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Jan. 16, 2018) (effectuating
shutdown); Hal Dardick & Steve Schmaedeke, Preckwinkle Agrees to Fewer Cook County Job
Cuts; Hundreds of Layoffs Still in Works, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-met-cook-county-budget-changes-20171120story.html [https://perma.cc/ABJ2-5UWJ] (detailing the aftereffects of budget showdown). The
mediation program’s loss was keenly felt, and borrowers and lenders both have suffered for it.
283. In its most extreme form, if a borrower simply shows up to court and has no idea what’s
going on, the most probable judicial reaction would be to sua sponte continue the matter to allow
them to seek legal counsel.
284. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1301(e) (2020) (vacation of default judgments); see also
supra note 217 (detailing the low threshold for vacation). For more on the procedures surrounding
vacation, see Horan, supra note 142 (engaging in a comprehensive discussion of vacation
provisions available in foreclosure cases).
285. This entails a paradox by analogy to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: a borrower can
either preserve the challenge to the publication calculation, or participate in the case, but not both.
Foreclosure is complicated, but it’s not quantum physics, and borrowers can have their cake and
eat it too. By participating in the case, the challenge is irrelevant. The borrower has gained
additional time—which is far more important than preserving a deeply weird procedural argument.
286. It goes without saying that this fact pattern, or anything even remotely resembling it, is
unknown in the appellate reporting, and unknown to the author (or anyone else with whom he has
consulted) at the trial level.
287. Why a lender would choose to reject a full payoff is both beyond the scope of this
hypothetical and a good indication of just how improbable this whole situation is. See supra Section
I.B.2 (noting that lenders tend to accept settlements, even if outside of IMFL’s strict requirements).
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In such a situation, the borrower might argue the lender should be
forced to accept reinstatement. But, even if redemption had been
improperly calculated based on the first, rather than third, publication, the
court would be powerless to revive or extend the redemption period. This
is because the IMFL’s language is clear: once expired, redemption “shall
not be revived.”288 Trial courts cannot extend it, and not even appellate
courts can restore it on remand.289
What a court could do, however, is sidestep the redemption issue
entirely, and order the lender to accept the money as an equitable
redemption instead.290 This might involve additional steps—vacating a
sale under the justice provision, for instance—but at its core, the remedy
to an improperly calculated statutory redemption period is not through
statutory redemption at all, but equitable redemption.291
Crucially, in such a situation, it would be unnecessary to address
whether the redemption calculation was correct or not. Because
redemption cannot be revived, the question of whether it was wrongly
terminated is irrelevant—and because the remedy comes through
equitable redemption, an examination of the mechanics of statutory
redemption is simply not necessary.292
The issue of whether redemption is to be calculated from the first or
third publication is one that will likely never see judicial review. By
raising the issue, borrowers moot it; even if it somehow survived, the
remedy necessarily comes elsewhere. A solution to this lingering issue
cannot come through the normal litigation process.
C. Potential Legislative Action
The core problem identified in this Article—that redemption is being
improperly calculated from the first, rather than third, date of
publication—is not a legislative problem. As argued in Part II above, the
statute is unambiguous; as demonstrated in Section III.A above, it is not
being followed. A legislative amendment to the redemption statute,
making explicit what is currently implicit, would certainly accomplish

288. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(c)(1) (2020).
289. See supra note 122 (collecting cases for, and discussing, both propositions). The only way
to revive reinstatement is to vacate the judgment itself—at which point the redemption period
would run from any renewed judgment, rather than service, making any challenge to calculation
from the first publication moot.
290. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1604 (2020) (discussing equitable redemption).
291. See generally supra Section I.C.4 (discussing uses of equitable redemption).
292. A court could certainly opine as to whether the “first publication” calculation was correct
or not, but it would not be necessary to do so to address and resolve the issue.
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the task.293 But it is not necessary, and other solutions, such as judicial
action, would be far more efficient.
Dissecting the nature of the redemption calculation has, however, shed
light on a related and genuinely legislative problem. It appears that the
“first publication” language of the reinstatement statute, introduced as
part of a clean-up bill that addressed fifteen different code sections,294
was included in error.295 The statutory structure of the IMFL suggests that
reinstatement and redemption were always meant to operate on the same
timetable. The arguably inadvertent “first publication” language in
reinstatement splits the two provisions, running counter to the original
design of the statute, introducing an unnecessary layer of complexity, and
operating to homeowners’ detriment to boot. It would be appropriate for
the General Assembly to correct this longstanding error and strike “first
publication” language from the reinstatement statute, thereby bringing
both reinstatement and redemption into their intended lockstep.296
Though fixing the reinstatement statute would be preferable in theory,
the fact of the matter is that the error is thirty years old. Whatever the
original reason for including “first publication” in reinstatement, it is by
now a fait accompli. The legislative record is unclear on many things, but
the one point on which there is no doubt is that amending the
reinstatement or redemption timetables has historically been a contested
matter.297 The statutory scheme of the IMFL would benefit from such a
fix, becoming simpler, consistent, and true to the original intent. But
though such an amendment would originate as a simple legislative fix, it
would surely be taken—and evaluated—as an attempt to lengthen the
reinstatement period. This thrusts the merits of such an amendment to
reinstatement firmly into the realm of public policy, as discussed further
in Section III.E below, and beyond the scope of this Article.

293. Borrowing from the language of the reinstatement statute, such an amendment could be as
simple as adding “When service is made by publication, the last date of publication shall be used
for the calculation” to section 1603(b)(1). 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/15-1603(b)(1) (2020).
Legislative amendments that are declarative of existing law are rare, but not unknown; of late, the
foreclosure caselaw has seen turmoil concerning the Residential Mortgage Licensing Act. See First
Mortg. Co. v. Dina, 2017 IL App (2d) 170043, ¶ 2 (featuring Dina II’s discussion of the original
Dina I decision and the General Assembly’s statutory rejection).
294. P.A. 86-974, 1989 Ill. Laws 6578 (eff. July 1, 1990).
295. See supra Section II.D.
296. Such an amendment would be straightforward indeed, and could be accomplished by
removing the “[w]hen service is made by publication, the first date of publication shall be used for
the calculation” sentence from section 1602. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/15-1602 (2020). Though
a few well-placed comments on the House floor couldn’t hurt, either.
297. See H.R., 86th Gen. Assemb., at 19–20 (Ill. 1989) (statement of Rep. Breslin) (discussing
the controversy in changes to timelines); Blanco & Crumbaugh, supra note 57, at 381 n.324 (noting,
in 1975, foreclosure experts recognized that legislators are reluctant to change redemption laws,
“because such action appears to disfavor mortgagors”).
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To address the issue concerning redemption, however, non-legislative
solutions are both simpler and more effective.
D. Judicial Action
Because the calculation of redemption from dates of publication
always occurs when no defendants have appeared to contest the
calculation, the best way of ensuring that it is calculated correctly is for
the judges who review and enter judgment orders to make it so.298 Judges
can and do review each case individually, and can correct errors on a
case-by-case basis. But on a broader level, this issue lends itself to the
issuance of a general order.
1. Case-by-Case Correction is Possible
If a judge were to agree with the above discussion regarding the proper
calculation of redemption, it would be within their discretion to direct the
redemption date in the judgment of foreclosure be amended to reflect the
proper calculation. Such a change could be done at the time of the
judgment’s entry by correcting the date on the proposed order; it would
take but a moment. And incorporating the redemption calculation in the
pre-hearing review of the file would ensure that the judge was aware of
the issue where and when it arose.299
Judgment orders are required to contain the last date of redemption.300
They also contain a great many other things, including technical language
such as full legal descriptions of the subject property, and end up running
in the five- to ten-page range.301 Due to their length and complexity,
judgment orders are usually drafted by plaintiff’s counsel and tendered
as proposed orders in the courtesy copy package.
Generally, the judge or chambers staff will review judgment motions
and proposed orders before their entry. Because the borrower has not
appeared to contest the case, this chambers review is often the only time

298. This is not necessarily so, but as a practical matter, it might as well be. See supra Section
III.B.1 (explaining if a borrower appears, the delay caused will inevitably push redemption beyond
any publication calculation).
299. The additional burden imposed by checking the redemption date against the publications
would be proportionate to the degree of review normally undertaken by chambers staff. See infra
note 303 (differing judicial philosophies).
300. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1506(e) (2020). This date is descriptive, rather than
proscriptive. Because redemption is calculated as a matter of law, the judgment order does not
“adjudicate” redemption in any sense; it simply identifies what that date is. See id. § 15-1603(b)(1)
(redemption calculation leaves no room for discretion).
301. A quick search on your legal database of choice will reveal hundreds. See, e.g., Bank of
N.Y. Mellon v. Shirley, 2019 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 1643 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 2019) (containing a
representative set of judgment orders). See supra note 82 (addressing the unsolved mystery of why
such orders are picked up for publication).
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the case is reviewed by a third-party neutral.302 Different judges will
review for different things, depending on the judge’s preferences, their
judicial philosophy, and—bluntly—chambers workload.303 Reviewing
for redemption in this situation would require implementing a workflow
change, but it would not be a substantial one.304
The underlying question here is one of awareness. If judges are aware
of the potential for miscalculated redemption under these circumstances,
they check for it, and they change it where appropriate, the issue is
resolved.305 But while resolving the issue on a case-by-case basis is good,
an institutional resolution is better.
2. A General Order Is Warranted
Ultimately, redemption is calculated the way it is because plaintiff’s
firms choose to do so a certain way. If they chose to do so another way—
in accordance with what this Article proposes the law requires—the
redemption issue resolves. The purpose of this Article is to identify and
discuss the issue; ideally, once the concern became known, plaintiff’s
firms would voluntarily change practices to comply with what is
proposed to be the correct interpretation of the law.306 Absent such a
change, however, there is one judicial tool that could be used to compel
compliance: a general order.

302. Plaintiff’s counsel will of course review the file, often many times. In the author’s
experience, on those occasions where a chambers review finds a problem, it is almost inevitably a
simple scrivener’s error or other inadvertent mistake of the sort to be expected in a volume business.
303. These first two are perhaps best described by example. One judge might believe that their
obligation is to ensure that the law is strictly complied with, and might review the file in depth—
checking to see that the required notices are in the record, reviewing the signature pages on the
mortgage documents, running the numbers on the plaintiff’s affidavit of amounts due and owing,
and so forth. Another judge might observe that such detailed review is akin to advocacy, and review
only for proof of service and proper notice, reasoning that the burden to ensure strict compliance
in all other respects should remain on the defendant. As the tone of this Article suggests, the author
tends towards the first of these two camps. This is not a question of right or wrong; it is simply of
differing judicial philosophies, and both are equally valid.
304. The author has reviewed many thousands of files for a number of judges under a number
of standards. Many of those judges already checked service affidavits and publications, where
present in a case. For those who did not, doing so would require only a few seconds more.
305. The author does not mean to suggest that judges who have reviewed and entered judgments
with miscalculated redemption dates have knowingly erred in any way. Judicial training materials,
like those at plaintiff’s firms, have a long and plodding pedigree, and simply don’t address the
issue. See supra Section III.A (discussing plaintiff’s-side institutional inertia). And under some
views of the issue, such review is simply not the judge’s job. See infra note 303 (discussing differing
judicial philosophies).
306. Or, if someone believes that calculating redemption from the first publication is in fact
correct, they naturally would be welcome to present a well-reasoned argument to keep doing so.
IMFL scholarship is a tiny field, and the author would welcome spirited debate on the issue!
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The chief judge of each circuit court has the authority to enter general
orders affecting all cases of a certain character in that circuit.307 In Cook
County,308 general orders affecting foreclosure cases are relatively
common, and have affected various procedures,309 set forth form
language for use in certain orders,310 and otherwise resolved statutory
ambiguity.311 Entry of a general order addressing the proper calculation
of redemption from service by publication would be consistent with other
types of matters addressed in prior general orders. And because this issue
only arises in uncontested cases, and voluntary compliance by the
plaintiff’s bar is institutionally unlikely, systemic judicial action provides
the simplest and most effective resolution.312
E. A Measured Policy Decision
This Article characterizes the proposed miscalculation of redemption
as an error, and one prevalent in contemporary foreclosure practice. But

307. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 21(c). In Cook County, this authority is devolved from the chief judge to
presiding judges of the various divisions. For a good overview of this authority, see U.S. Bank v.
Dzis, 2011 IL App (1st) 102812, ¶ 20. Because foreclosures are classified as chancery cases,
general orders affecting foreclosures are entered in the Chancery Division. Note that, in Cook,
orders entered by presiding judges, such as these, are known as General Administrative Orders
(GAO), to distinguish from General Orders entered by the chief judge on a countywide basis.
Nomenclature aside, the effect is the same, and this Article uniformly adopts the language of
general orders, on the understanding that, in Cook, it would be a GAO instead.
308. Cook is not the only county to issue general orders addressing foreclosures. See, e.g.,
General Order No. 13-23 (Cir. Ct. Kane Co. May 6, 2013) (supplementing Rule 113 with mandatory
language in notice of default). But because Cook is by far the most populous county, with the most
foreclosures, it is unsurprising that its general order regime governing such cases is the most
comprehensive. The frequency of general orders is a function of how sprawling a given jurisdiction
is. Smaller counties simply would not need as many general orders, because it is more efficient for
judges to simply address the cases before them, without need of general pronouncements.
309. See, e.g., General Administrative Order 2016-03 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. April 7, 2016) (setting
forth legal standard for reformation of mortgage); General Administrative Order 2012-10 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co. Nov. 27, 2012) (formalizing sixty-day rule).
310. See, e.g., General Administrative Order 2018-03 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Aug. 8, 2018)
(judgment language for third-party marketing platforms); General Administrative Order 2018-02
(Cir. Ct. Cook Co. April 9, 2018) (real estate transfer tax language in orders approving sale).
311. See, e.g., General Administrative Order 2017-02 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. Mar. 16, 2017)
(bonding requirements for selling officers); General Administrative Order 2012-06 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Co. April 26, 2012) (form language in judgments of foreclosure to comply with publication of sale
requirements).
312. Entry of a general order in one county would only affect cases in that county. The author’s
experience is in Cook, which necessarily injects some bias to this discussion. That having been
said: because Cook is home to 40 percent of the state’s population, it is also home to the plurality
of foreclosure cases. If Cook imposes a requirement, and plaintiff’s firms change their procedures
to account for it, such change is usually found in other counties, because it is easier to maintain one
system than two. It can be reasonably speculated that, if systemic change in Cook affected the
calculation of redemption for Cook County foreclosures, the solution would propagate itself to the
rest of the state. And, at the very least, a change in Cook alone would resolve hundreds of potentially
improperly calculated foreclosures per year, an action with intrinsic value.
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it is possible to treat the “first publication” calculation not as an error, but
as a natural consequence of failing to participate in court proceedings.
Failure to participate leads to other penalties—default judgment, for
instance—so why should a fringe reduction in redemption be treated
differently?
There are numerous potential arguments in favor of such a position,
but perhaps the most compelling is that, in order for miscalculated
redemption to affect them, the borrower must not have participated in any
meaningful way. As noted in Section III.B above, if the borrower
interacts with the case before entry of judgment, virtually any amount of
activity in a case would moot the issue. If they participated after entry of
judgment, because judgments are easily vacated, prejudice is easily
cured.313
And there are plenty of other procedural mechanisms that offer some
degree of protection against this situation arising in the first place. Chief
among them is the fact that service by publication can only occur after a
lender undertakes a diligent search to execute service through normal
means.314 This will almost always involve repeated service attempts at
the subject property, at any other property with which the borrower is
affiliated, and a small blizzard of legal mailings.315
In other words, if a borrower is wholly unresponsive throughout this
entire months-long process, how much prejudice can truly occur by
losing two weeks of redemption? In any sort of equitable analysis, it
could be strongly argued that their utter inaction justifies trimming access
to redemption.
This is the policy rationale underlying the “first publication” exception
in the reinstatement statute.316 More broadly, this rationale grounds any
limitation on the redemptive mechanisms of the IMFL: the borrower’s
redemptive rights have to be cut short sooner or later, and it makes sense
to truncate them based on this type of metric. Nonresidential properties
get six months, severely underwater properties get sixty days, and
313. For more on the many ways in which vacations can occur, see Horan, supra note 142, at
43 (table of procedural postures and standards). As observed earlier, around seventy percent of
foreclosure cases end in a voluntary dismissal. See supra note 4 (statistical analysis). Settlements
routinely occur following entry of judgment, which is routinely vacated as part of the dismissal
itself.
314. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a-5) (2020).
315. Unsurprisingly, the borrower participation rate for cases where service occurred by
publication (approximately six percent) is substantially less than the participation rate for
foreclosure cases generally (around thirty percent). See supra note 4 (statistical analysis). Because
service by publication necessarily entails the exhaustion of normal service methods, this suggests
that the process is working as intended: service by publication captures those borrowers who are
genuinely not amenable to regular service—evading service, have moved out of state, are deceased,
and so forth.
316. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1602 (2020) (detailing “first publication”).
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abandoned properties get thirty days.317 The entire statutory scheme
countenances meting out redemption on a case-by-case basis.
But that is exactly why the redemption period cannot be cut short. If
the past two hundred years of foreclosure law demonstrate nothing else,
it is that the exact measure of redemption is, and always has been, a
contested subject.318 The IMFL is ultimately a grand bargain between the
rights of lenders and the time periods available to borrowers. As part of
that bargain, borrowers are entitled to their redemption period under the
letter of the law.319
The question then becomes what that law should be: the length of the
redemption period is first and foremost a policy decision. In 1825, that
policy called for a twelve-month post-sale right; in 1987, policy crafted
the current seven-month window. But the fact remains that seven-month
redemption is a policy decision that the General Assembly has already
made.
Redemption can certainly be shortened or extended, under whatever
terms and for whatever classes of borrowers as may be appropriate. But
doing so is inherently a policy decision, one that has historically been
hotly contested and solely legislative—demonstrated by, if nothing else,
the multiple carve-outs of section 1603 and its predecessors.320
If redemption is to be cut short where a borrower is served by
publication, doing so is quite easy: add “first publication” language to
section 1603, just as it is in section 1602.321 But that must be a legislative
act. Major policy decisions—and, in the foreclosure context, any
alteration to the length of redemption is one such decision—cannot and
should not be made by accident or implication. “The history of liberty has
largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards,”322 and
317. Id. § 15-1603(b)(2), (3), and (4), respectively. These periods have been tested over many
years, and each is accepted as constitutionally valid. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi.
v. Walker, 437 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ill. 1982) (holding that the ninety-day reinstatement period meets
rational basis test).
318. See, e.g., supra Section I.C (discussing historical developments of redemptive
mechanisms).
319. So it has been for hundreds of years. See, e.g., Stone v. Gardner, 20 Ill. 304, 309 (1858)
(strictly construing redemption statute against judgment creditor who did not comply with its
terms).
320. See generally 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b) (2020). The most complex version of
the prior statute, immediately prior to its incorporation in the Code of Civil Procedure, had nine
different subsections dedicated solely to different flavors of residential redemption. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 77, § 18 (1979). See supra note 297 (collecting sources for contested nature of changes).
321. This Article does not take a position on whether such change would be desirable. As with
many policy decisions, the ramifications of changing the redemption period, even in a small way,
implicate practical concerns well beyond the scope of this Article.
322. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., majority opinion).
McNabb itself was, ironically, later superseded by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1990)
(2020).
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until and unless the redemption statute is amended, it must be applied by
its terms. Redemption must run from the third publication date.
CONCLUSION
When a mortgagor is served by publication, the statutory redemption
period must run from the third date of publication, not the first. Where
the borrower participates in the case, this calculation is unused and the
point is moot. But if the borrower does not participate in the case, and the
lender miscalculates redemption from the first date of publication, the
entire foreclosure process is accelerated by two weeks. The expiry of
redemption, the judicial sale, and ultimately the borrower’s eviction
happen two weeks too early. This is not in accord with the plain language
of, or legislative intent underlying, the IMFL.
This miscalculation occurs not by malice but by ignorance; the
complex history of the redemption statute, plus various institutional
pressures on the plaintiffs who actually calculate and propose the
redemption periods in the first place, make it easy for this error to occur
and slip through unnoticed. Miscalculated redemption is an infrequent
but regular occurrence: an estimated 430 cases per year in Cook County
alone are procedurally flawed in this respect.
Ultimately, the problem is one of awareness. Plaintiff’s firms can
change their own calculations to conform to the statute’s requirements.
Individual judges can enforce a proper calculation on a case-by-case
basis. Ideally, a broader general order would compel systemic change.
However given effect, a proper calculation of statutory redemption from
the third date of publication would comport with the meaning and intent
of the IMFL, and ensure that the foreclosure process gives all borrowers
the protections required by law.

